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INTRODUCTION
The enactment of Chapter 93B of the Massachusetts General
Laws' has provided the auto dealers of Massachusetts with a true
"Bill of Rights" governing their relationship with the auto manufac-
turers. At the heart of this Chapter are prohibitions against terminat-
ing or failing to renew a dealership except for due cause, 2 or engaging
"in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconsciona-
ble. . . 2'8 Although legislation directly affecting only a few hundred
businesses' might appear rather specialized, this statute, the first of
such pervasive scope in the nation, may set a precedent for the entire
automobile industry.' As a possible forerunner of similar legislation
1
 Acts 1970, ch. 814 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 712 (West 1970)), effective Jan. 1, 1971.
2
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(c) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 714 (West 1970)).
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(1) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
4 It is generally accepted that there are approximately 800 auto dealers in the state,
and that over 90% of their sales are of vehicles manufactured by the "Big Three,"
namely, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.
5
 Although the statute is not the first in the nation affecting automobile dealers,
particularly with regard to termination or failure to renew the franchise, it goes far
beyond that crucial aspect of the relationship. Indeed, this statute, in addition to other
state statutes of more limited scope, has undoubtedly had immediate impact in the form
of the revisions to its standard dealer contract announced by General Motors in
December of 1970.
In addition to the federal Auto Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221-225
(1964), discussed infra, the following states are among those which have enacted legisla-
tion protecting auto dealers:
Colorado:
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-11-14(10), (11) (1964). Section 13-I1-14(11)(d), which pro-
hibited any cancellation of a motor vehicle dealer's franchise "unfairly, without due
regard to the equities of said dealer and without just provocation . . ." was held
unconstitutionally vague in General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 395
(D. Colo. 1956), in light of the fact that another section of the same article imposed
criminal penalties for violation of any of its provisions. Contra, E.L. Bowen & Co. v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 153 F. Supp. 42, 45-46 (E.D. Va. 1957); Ford Motor
Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 571-75, 335 S.W.2d 360, 365-67 (1960), in which the
court criticizes the Blevins case rather pointedly; Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns,
29 Wis.2d 78, 94-95, 138 N.W.2d 214, 222-23 (1965).
Florida:
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 320.64(8) (1968) parallels the wording of the Colorado statute,
supra. The Florida statutes also impose criminal penalties for violations. See Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 320.70 (1968).
Iowa:
Iowa Code Ann. § 322.3 (1966). This statute prohibits an auto manufacturer from
terminating or failing to renew any franchise "without just, reasonable and lawful
cause therefor • ." Iowa Code Ann. § 322.3(5). Unlike the Colorado and Florida
statutes, supra, this provision is expressly exempted from the section imposing
criminal liability for violations, thus avoiding the vagueness problem which resulted
in the Colorado statute being declared unconstitutional. See Iowa Code Ann. {1 322.14
(1966).
Minnesota:
Minn. Stat. Ann. { 168-27 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1970). This statute makes
it unlawful for any auto manufacturer "Rio cancel or refuse to renew fa] franchise
. . . without just cause." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 168.27(14)(3). Its constitutionality has
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for all franchisees in other states, the Massachusetts statute could
ultimately affect a marketing system encompassing over ten percent
of the Gross National Product and twenty-five percent of all retail
sales. Moreover, because it has been demonstrated that the power
exercised by franchisors over their franchisees has a direct effect upon
the franchisee's dealings with his customers,' the statute may have
repercussions extending into every home.
been sustained in Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
469 (D. Minn. 1956).
New York:
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 197 (McKinney 1968), as recently amended by ch. 582 of the
1970 Laws, prohibits termination of a franchise "except for cause." Section 197-a,
also .added by ch. 582 of the 1970 Laws, prohibits any failure to renew a franchise
"except in good faith."
North Carolina:
Gen. Stat. N.C. § 20-305(3) (1965) parallels the wording of the Colorado statute,
supra. North Carolina also imposes criminal penalties for violations. See Gen. Stat.
N.C. § 20-308 (1965).
Rhode Island:
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-5-23(8) (1969) also parallels the wording of the Colorado
statute, supra. Criminal penalties for violations are imposed by R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 31-5-27 and 31-5-39 (1969).
Tennessee:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1714(h)(4) (1958) also parallels the wording of the Colorado
statute, supra. Tennessee also imposes criminal penalties for violations. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 59-1718 (1968).
Wisconsin:
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 218.01(3) (a)(15)-(17) (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1970). Section
218.01(3)(a) (17) of the Wisconsin statutes parallels the wording of the Colorado
statute, supra. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has found the statute on its face
"to be a proper exercise of the police power. . . ." Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v.
Karns, 29 Wis.2d 78, 94, 138 N.W.2d 214, 222 (1965). Criminal penalties are imposed
for violations. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 218.01(8) (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
Some jurisdictions have enacted similar laws affecting franchisees in general. These
include:
Delaware:
The recently enacted Laws of Delaware 1970, ch. 693 added a new subchapter 111,
containing §§ 25.51-256, to DeI. Cade Ann. tit. 6, ch. 25, to prohibit "unjust" termina-
tion of or failure to renew a franchise; "unjust" being defined as "without good
cause" or "in bad faith."
Puerto Rico:
Laws P.R. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 278-278d (Supp. 1969) grants an action for damages if
a dealership is not renewed or is terminated without "just cause," a phrase of civil
law origin, akin to "good faith."
e See the remarks of Congressman Rooney, whose search for the reasons behind the
high-pressure sales techniques of magazine salesmen led him to discover that Cowles
Publishing Co. had initiated an incredible annual increase in distributors' quotas, thereby
pushing the distributors to fraudulent excesses fn a futile effort to survive. 115 Cong.
Rec. H12,098-103 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1969) ; 115 Cong. Rec. E11,150-52 (daily ed. Dec.
29, 1969). See also Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc: v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 456
(W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3rd Cir.' 1969), which involved a claim that the
sales quota established by the manufacturer for all dealers was so high that most could
not achieve it; R. Nader, L. Dodge & R. Hotchkiss, What to Do With Your Bad Car; An
Action Manual for Lemon Owners 122 (Grossman 1971) [hereinafter cited as Nader]
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The primary purpose of this article will be to summarize and
analyze the provisions of the new Massachusetts statute viewed in
its factual and legal context. Actual practices in the auto industry
will be emphasized, demonstrating their lack of economic justifica-
tion and their inherent unfairness both to the dealers and to their
customers. The legality of these practices will also be evaluated, in
somewhat limited detail, in light of both existing statutes? and the
pertinent case law, principally in the federal arena. Finally, the pat-
tern and specific terms of the Massachusetts Act will be discussed,
with emphasis upon its contribution to the solution of these issues and
its potential impact on a national scale.
I. THE PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THE ACT
A full appreciation of the provisions contained in the new Act
requires an exposition of the business practices of which auto dealers
have complained for decades. 8
 There is little need to provide statistics
to demonstrate that the principal auto manufacturers are economic
giants and that the industry is dominated by the "Big Three" as an
oligopoly.° The total dependence of the auto dealers on but a few
factories for their continued source of supply severely limits their
scope of trading power in the general markee° While franchisees in
(in which the authors report that as a result of manufacturer refusals to reimburse
dealers for pre-delivery and warranty work, customers sometimes get "the sunshine
treatment" whereby the car is parked in the lot for a few days and then the customer
is called and told the job is done); E. Ayres, What's Good far GM 137 (Aurora 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Ayres] (quoting a dealer's letter to the Automotive News to the
effect that, "When G.M. delivers cars to its dealers [they] have so many things wrong
with them that it takes three to four times more time to precondition them for delivery
to the customer .. . ." Ayres also reports that as a result of inadequate payment for
warranty work dealers must make extra charges for non-warranty work. Id. at 130.
7 The statutory discussion will include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) ;
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1964); the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964); the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964);
the federal Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. H 1221
-225 (1964) ; and related
measures.
8 See generally Hearings on the Role of Giant Corporations in the American and
World Economies Before the Sub comm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on
Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
9
 Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.D. Pa.
1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3rd Cir. 1969). The figures are literally staggering—nine
million new vehicles are sold annually, tens of millions more are already on the roads,
and close to thirty thousand automobile dealers across the country sell and service these
vehicles.
to See Ayres, supra note 6, at 127-28 suggesting that with less than 3% of all
domestic dealerships representing more than one manufacturer, the reason for the
manufacturers' preference for the single dealership is that it "heightens the barrier to
new competition." See the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 335 U.S. 303, 323 (1948) ("The dealers are thus economic dependents of the
company whose cars they sell.") ; Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis.2d 78, 85,
138 N.W.2d 214, 217 (1965) ("Implicit in this law is the recognition of the gross disparity
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general often complain of excessive control and abuses by their fran-
chisors,"the structure of the automobile industry implicitly embodies
these very factors. In varying degrees, each of the auto manufacturers
has been the object of bitter dealer complaints," loosely categorized
as encompassing "operating," "capital" and "administrative" items.
A. Dealer Complaints Concerning "Operating Items"
In the operating class are such matters as adequate and prompt
payment for pre-delivery work performed by the dealer as the final
step in the manufacturing process, and reimbursement for labor and
parts supplied to satisfy the manufacturer's express warranty to the
consumer. In each instance, dealers have long contended that in order
to continue to function, they must perform this work at their own
expense, but then find themselves at the mercy of the manufacturer
with respect to allowance of the claim, the standard of payment, and
actual receipt of the funds." Even in 1970, it is claimed that in order
to show a modest interim profit, one major manufacturer has held up
the processing of some eight hundred thousand claims for warranty
reimbursement." For years it was recognized that the reimbursement
rate for labor was grossly below the dealer's actual costs,' and even
now reimbursement for parts is at net cost plus twenty-five percent,
which approximately equals the average markup obtained by dealers
selling to wholesalers."
of bargaining power between the manufacturer of automobiles and the local retailer.").
See generally FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968), for a discussion of comparable
problems confronting the gasoline station dealers vis-a-vis the major oil companies.
11 See generally H. Brown, Franchising: Trap for the Trusting (2d printing 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Brown]; Brown, Franchising—The Franchisee's Viewpoint; Remedies,
in The Realities of Franchising, A Guide for the Practicing Attorney 13-26 (Mass.
Continuing Legal Education, Inc. ed., Faneuil Press 1970) ; Hearings on the Impact
of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Economic
Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
12 See Brown, supra note 11, at 77-86; Ayres, supra note 6, at 105-37.
13 See Nader, supra note 6, at 113, reporting that under the manufacturer's pricing
policy, the dealer does not obtain reimbursement for pre-delivery work except for
extraordinary repairs, but has to look to his customer for such compensation. As for
reimbursement for warranty work, the dealer may be paid 35% less than what he
receives for identical work, for regular customers, and is subject to constant uncertainty
as to whether the manufacturer will accept responsibility for the warranty repairs. See
Car Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, vol. V, no,. 9, Dec. 14, 1970, at 2, in which Lowell
Dodge, an associate of Ralph Nader, commented in an interview that ". . . when a
dealer is over zone average on warranty claims, he gets an audit, or he has to get prior
approval for anything over $50."
14 See Car Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, vol. IV, no. 22, March 16, 1970, at 4.
15 Brown, supra note 11, at 84 & n.20.
15 FTC, Staff Report on Automobile Warranties 133-35 (Nov. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as FTC Report]. Overall compensation for warranty work is demonstrably lower
than that received by dealers for comparable non-warranty work. See Ayres, supra note
6, at 130, noting confirmation of underpayment in a study conducted in 1968 by the
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With regard to pre-delivery inspection before the sale to a cus-
tomer, dealers claim that actual costs of this work run from twenty
to thirty dollars more per car than the amounts allowed by the manu-
facturers.17
 This inequity has been compounded by the increasing
frequency of manufacturing deficiencies and damage in transit." In
addition, some manufacturers allow dealers to obtain reimbursement
only after the vehicle is sold to a consumer.
It is not difficult to perceive the effect of these abuses upon
consumers. Where auto dealers are financially pressed just to break
even on pre-delivery and warranty work," it is certainly foreseeable
that consumers may be shortchanged by dealers. Hard pressed eco-
nomically by rapidly increasing costs, and perhaps buffeted by the
economic recession, a dealer has little choice but to cut corners with
his customers," and may even be pressed into filing fraudulent claims
with the manufacturer for reimbursement. 2' While such practices by
Management Information Corporation for the National Automobile Dealers Association,
later corroborated in a study conducted for Ford by Arthur Andersen and Company. In
its own study, G.M. contested these findings. A Ford representative, however, reportedly
testified in a Tennessee lawsuit that dealers were paid 35% less for warranty work than
they receive for the identical work performed for regular customers. Nader, supra note 6,
at 122.
17
 FTC Report, supra note 16, at 130.
18
 Because the manufacturers do not use available inspection systems or even road-
test cars before domestic sale, serious manufacturing defects are passed on to the dealer.
Although he can theoretically obtain factory reimbursement for "extraordinary" repairs,
the chance of obtaining payment is remote except in rare circumstances. See Nader,
supra note 6, at 112-13. In a confidential report to the author, a luxury car dealer of over
25 years' standing, told of his repeated refusal to accept a truck-load of damaged vehicles
until the factory acceded to an independent appraisal of the damage and expressly
agreed to pay. The theoretical right to such payment for extraordinary repairs had
been so frequently violated that the dealer was willing to risk his dealership rather than
submit to further abuse. See also FTC Report, supra note 16, at 191-92, outlining the
increasing shortage of skilled workers and the industry's unpreparedness for a 50%
increase in annual production from 1965 to the present. In the face of such difficulties,
Chrysler's adoption of the "5-year-or-50,000-mile" warranty, followed by Ford and
General Motors, constituted nothing more than a selling ploy, rather than a reflection
of increased manufacturer confidence in the quality of new vehicles. The brunt of this
expanded warranty was borne by the dealers who had to fulfill its provisions at a loss.
See Nader, supra note 6, at 127-29.
12 In Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.6 (2d Cir.
1970), the court footnoted that for the latest year, the dealer's questioned claims for
warranty reimbursement ranged from 48% to 106% of its annual net profits.
20 In a December 5, 1969, bulletin "To All Chevrolet Dealers," Robert D. Lund,
General Sales Manager of Chevrolet, advised all dealers that "[u]nless a safety defect
is discovered, no warranty work is to be performed unless requested by the customer and
needed." Nader, supra note 6, at 123. When G.M. discovered that a dealer had com-
plained to Senator Philip Hart, a "clarification" was sent on January 16, 1970, allowing
performance of needed warranty work without owner request, but only on approval of
the dealer's service management. Id.
21 For a case involving allegations of such conduct see Semmes Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970), arising from an attempt by Ford to audit
a dealer's warranty claims by interviewing the dealer's customers.
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marginal dealers are hardly excusable," the remedy may lie not in
further punishment of the dealer, but rather in the proper recognition
of the source of these problems—the abusive manufacturer practices.
Another principal complaint on the part of auto dealers concerns
the subsidies granted to leasing and fleet buyers. Although such
subsidies have technically been channeled through dealers, with a
modest allowance to the dealer for processing each vehicle, in economic
reality the subsidy emanates from the manufacturer. It has been
difficult to assess the amount of the allowance per car, because in
addition to the usual cash allowance of approximately $150, the
subsidy may assume various other forms. For example, the vehicle
may have various accessories or optional equipment for which no
charge is made. Also, each of the Big Three grants an unknown
allowance to one of the three major leasing companies for joint adver-
tising contributions," and vehicles purchased by the leasing com-
panies are sold with a guaranteed repurchase price at the end of six
months.24 The three major leasing companies are allowed to perform
their own warranty work, with full and prompt cash reimbursement
by the manufacturer. Finally, when the manufacturer repurchases
the vehicle at the end of six months, the new car warranty recom-
mences on the resale of the vehicle, and dealers who purchase such
vehicles are extended automatic floor plan loans by the manufacturer.
Although estimates of the composite value of such subsidies vary,
in recent litigation alleging a Big Three combination to drop the
subsidies, it is claimed that each vehicle now involves an additional
cost of $700." The most flagrant example of these subsidies in opera-
tion prior to their recent renunciation by the Big Three, occurred in
December, 1969, and involved the sale of several thousand autos to
a major leasing company. One of the Big Three offered the vehicles
to the leasing concern at $950 per car below the regular dealer cost,
22 In Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970),
sustaining a temporary injunction against termination of a dealership under the Dealers'
Day in Court Act, Judge Friendly cautioned, ". . . any dealer who regards [the lower
court's decision] as a Magna Carta for cheating Ford or any other manufacturer does
so at his peril." Query whether this observation would have been appropriate had the
complaint alleged antitrust violations, rather than violations of the Dealers' Day in
Court Act, in light of the Supreme Court's denial of pari delicto as a defense in antitrust
suits. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
23 it is reported that when Ford won the Hertz account from Chevrolet over a
decade ago, it doubled its $10 million advertising contribution to the rental company
and has periodically effected additional generous increases. Similar amounts are allegedly
paid by Chrysler to Avis and by General Motors to National. Car Dealer "Insider"
Newsletter, vol. V, no. 11, Dec. 28, 1970, at 1-2.
24 One factory utilizes a six-month lease, rather than a sale and repurchase guarantee,
though each method is economically equivalent.
35 City of Philadelphia v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 70-2753 (RD. Pa., filed
Oct. 7, 1970).
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but lost the contract to another of the Big Three which bid over
$1,000 below dealer's cost.
The principal complaint of the dealers with respect to such
subsidies lies in their claim that there can be no economic or legal
justification for their having to pay the factory more for the identical
product, when they must then compete with the leasing companies
in the same consumer market. 2° Legal considerations aside, the dealers
can see no economic justification for quantity discounts, advertising
allowances, or the other preferential benefits accorded the leasing
companies, since the dealers buy more, advertise more, and perform
the identical functions. Even further, the dealers have had to bear the
brunt of consumer complaints, particularly those voiced through
legislatures and consumer councils. Yet, because ten percent of all
vehicles are sold at a discount to the leasing and fleet buyers, it is the
general public which inevitably has to make up for such discounts.
For example, when vehicles discounted in this manner are resold
each six months, their prices are usually far below the market value
for comparable used cars. Every car owner thus loses some value on
his trade-in, thereby paying his pro-rata share of the discount subsidy
to preferred buyers. Although a few consumers may pick up a bargain,
the buyers of ninety percent of all new vehicles suffer the economic
consequences through the excessive depreciation of their used car
trade-ins. Although the Big Three have now renounced such subsidies
commencing with the 1971 model year, this action contains no assur-
ance against back-sliding, and does not precisely disclose whether all
forms of subsidizing will be discontinued."
In daily operations, each dealer is perhaps most concerned with
the product received from the manufacturer. At one end of the spec-
trum, favored dealers may receive unfair allotments of the most de-
sirable merchandise. For example, when one of the manufacturers
recently announced an extremely desirable low-priced model, it was
confidentially reported to the author that favored dealers were
promised immediate delivery of hundreds of that model, while others
received but a handful. Conversely, the manufacturer may seek to
unload excessive production in certain lines, mistakes in production,"
26 One of the three major leasing companies has now publicly instituted a "lease or
buy" program, placing it in direct competition with regular retail dealers. See Car Dealer
"Insider" Newsletter, vol. V, no. 19, Feb. 22, 1971, at 1-2.
27 It is reported that generous increases in 1971 advertising allowances have more
than made up for the dropping of cash discounts and guaranteed repurchase plans. Car
Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, vol. V, no. 11, Dec. 28, 1970, at 1.
28 See Louis, Chrysler's Private Hard Times, Fortune, vol. LXXXI, no. 4, April,
1970, at 102, 146, particularly with reference to the several hundred luxury models er-
roneously manufactured in a "stripped condition" with standard transmissions and no
radio, heater, power steering or power brakes.
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or vehicles "loaded" with high-profit extra equipment; or it may
merely wish to guarantee early distribution of the entire end-run in a
model year."
The seldom discussed area of parts, accessories and supplies may
well involve more problems than any other aspect of the manufacturer-
dealer relationship, stemming from the fact that each manufacturer
has a preemptive position for replacement of its own products." Here
again, there can be extremes at both ends, with some manufacturers
insisting that the dealer carry an excessive inventoryn and others
taking an inordinately long time to fill dealer orders for replacement
parts." Even when parts are available from the manufacturer, capri-
cious price changes during the model year can leave dealers with
higher priced parts and only a theoretical chance to avoid losses
through a cumbersome return procedure." With respect to many parts,
accessories and supplies, the manufacturers exercise varying degrees
of pressure to induce their dealers to purchase from them at inflated
prices even though alternate sources of supply are available." Such
pressure may encompass the entire range of persuasion, from simple
sales talk or offers of preferential treatment to implicit threats of a
29 This is accomplished by requiring all closing orders for the model year to be
received by May 1, with the dealer taking the risk of unwanted styles, etc., or else
foregoing a normal supply for inventory.
Another perennial source of irritation to dealers has been abuse of "minimum sales
requirement" (MSR) quotas. See Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283
F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3rd Cir. 1969), involving a
claim that the MSR established by the manufacturer for all dealers was so high that
most could not attain it. In the Fall of 1970, Chrysler modified the MSR approach
with a "push-pull sales incentive program," offering certain discounts to dealers who
assented to a high quota. When the quotas assigned were found to be extremely high,
Chrysler reduced them for complaining dealers by 25%. Car Dealer "Insider" Newsletter,
vol. V, no. 9, Dec. 14, 1970, at 4.
80 At least one major manufacturer expressly prescribes in the dealer's franchise
agreement that all replacement parts must be purchased exclusively from the factory.
81 A rejected amendment which Chrysler Corporation proposed for addition to
Section 4(4) (c) of the new Massachusetts Auto Dealers' Act would have provided that
dealers must at all times carry a 90-day inventory of repair parts.
32 See Car Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, vol. III, no. 33, May 26, 1969, at 3.
33 When the price of a part is reduced by the factory, the dealer cannot obtain a
credit for the identical parts he may have in inventory, but within certain time limits, he
can return parts on band for credit at invoice cost and reorder the identical part at the
new price. Realistically, in order to take advantage of this procedure, the dealer would
have to maintain a perpetual inventory of all of the thousands of parts he has on hand,
constantly monitor all price changes, and scramble to return the higher-priced parts
within the prescribed time limit.
34 See Ayres, supra note 6, at 139-61, describing the exclusionary tactics of the Big
Three against Automatic Radio Company, the sole remaining independent producer of
car radios, through the simple device of denying access to advance information concern-
ing the dimensions of the hole in which the radio was to be inserted. Since several
months are needed for tooling, refusal to supply this simple data effectively precluded
Automatic from producing radios for new vehicles.
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slowdown in deliveries." Perhaps worst of all, each manufacturer has
an extensive list of "captive" parts—items which can be purchased
only from the factory even though manufactured by third parties."
Suffice it to say that this particular subject is so complex and rife with
competitive abuse that the FTC is presently conducting an extensive
survey to unravel its ramifications, particularly with respect to inde-
pendent body repair shops." Both with respect to the vehicles and the
parts supplied by the factories, the dealers have no alternative but to
pass on to consumers the same conditions as the manufacturers im-
a5
 In a similar context, involving the major oil companies and their gasoline station
dealers, the Supreme Court affirmed a finding of compulsion even in the absence of any
"overt coercive acts." The Court found that an oil company's position of dominance
over its dealers was "inherently coercive" since each dealer fully recognized what was
expected of him. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1968).
36 This term refers to parts and accessories manufactured by captive suppliers who
apparently contract not to deal directly with the dealers. Compare the situation in
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (holding an agreement
not to supply appliances to a particular retail outlet to be a per se boycott violation of
the antitrust laws). There are intimations that the factory adds a markup of several
hundred percent on such "captive" parts, though for a captive market, the profit margin
should be substantially less than that of an ordinary seller who has to bear the risk of
inventory losses. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 127.
The demand for such over-priced captive parts is increased by the fact that con-
temporary automobiles are so vulnerable to crash damage. Tests conducted by the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety disclosed that crashes in the 5 to 10 m.p.h. range
caused damage ranging from $64 to over $800. See Nader, supra note 6, at 107-08. Nader
further reports:
The design of these automobiles seems explicitly intended to increase the
demand for replacement parts, almost all of which are sold exclusively by the
same companies responsible for the damage-prone design in the first place.
Id. See the similar testimony of Dr. William Haddon, Jr., former Director of the Na-
tional Highway Safety Bureau of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and now
President of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, given March 10, 1971, before a
subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee. Dr. Haddon testified that the average
damage to 1971 models in crashes at 5 to 10 m.p.h. had risen markedly from the results
for 1970 models. He went on to note that there is "a highly remunerative market in
replacement parts sales, most of which automobile design has made certain will be made
by the maker of the automobile itself." When asked by Senator Philip A. Hart if manu-
facturers deliberately designed cars that were vulnerable to costly damage, Dr. Haddon
responded, "It should be obvious to all. They do it knowingly." N.Y. Times, March 11,
1971, at 70, col. 1.
If the exorbitant manufacturer markups on "captive" parts are confirmed in the
pending case of DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., Civil No. 70-3331 (ED. Pa., filed Dec. 3,
1970), it may explain in part the spiraling increase in the cost of auto repairs and the
attendant rise in property damage insurance premiums. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 207.
37
 See Trade Regulation Reports, no. 460, April 6, 1970, at 9-10, outlining FTC
Chairman Casper W. Weinberger's statement of March 18, 1970 before the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly; Parts, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 19,336, at
21,477-78 (FTC 1970); Maremont Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,401, at 21,521 (FTC
1970) (consent order requiring divestiture by auto parts company of warehouse dis-
tributors and jobber stores having 1969 sales of more than $100 million); United
States v. Ford Motor Co., — F. Supp. —, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 73,445 (11 Mich. 1971)
(decree in antimerger suit requiring divestiture of acquired spark plug plant, battery
plant and trade name "Autolite").
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pose upon the dealers. When consumers complain of having to buy
models "loaded" with expensive accessories or of having to pay ever-
increasing charges for repair parts, the dealer, who acts merely as a
conduit, can hardly be blamed.
In the areas of advertising, special sales campaigns and retail
prices to consumers, the factory again dominates, and inevitably at the
dealer's expense. For example, one of the Big Three requires each
dealer to contribute $15 per vehicle to a national advertising fund
theoretically administered by the dealers themselves. In fact, all ad-
vertising is composed and placed by the manufacturers, including
periodic national sales campaigns, which advertise special "giveaways"
on items such as power transmissions or power brakes—although there
is no corresponding reduction in the manufacturer's price to the dealer.
In response to recent complaints that the suggested retail price pre-
scribed by the manufacturers is exaggerated merely to give the con-
sumer the impression that he can get a real bargain," the current
trend among the manufacturers is to reduce the suggested retail price
to such a low percentage markup that the dealer can barely survive."
B. Dealer Complaints Concerning "Capital Items"
Although not so readily visible, the more basic complaints em-
anate from capital matters which relate directly to the dealer's
equity in his business. Ranking high in the hierarchy of such com-
plaints is the dealers' objection that the manufacturers have persis-
tently refused to recognize any element of dealer-developed business
"goodwill" as an essential ingredient in the manufacturer-dealer rela-
tionship." The manufacturers' position on this subject is epitomized
in the legislative statement presented by General Motors in opposition
38 These complaints have led to the recent announcement by the FTC of a proposed
trade regulation rule which would prohibit the use of fictitiously high retail prices and
misleading comparative pricing claims resulting from failure to disclose that formerly
"standard" equipment on the model in question is now "optional" or not available at
all. The proposed regulations would supply interpretations of the Automobile Informa-
tion Disclosure Act. See Trade Regulation Reports, no. 488, Oct. 19, 1970, at 4-5.
39 Car Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, vol. V., no. 6, Nov. 23, 1970, at 1-2 reports that
new sticker prices will embody markups in the 15% bracket. Given the exaggerated
sticker prices for prior years, it will be difficult to convince consumers of any radical
change.
49 See Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080, 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. 73,330 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 872 (1971) (holding that the trial
court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. on the grounds that no damage was shown as a
result of termination of an aircraft dealership. In so holding the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit observed:
(\Vie are in a day and age in which the value of the nationally advertised
franchise is a matter of general recognition. If [the plaintiff] were deprived of
the dealership (or franchise right) as a result of an illegal conspiracy, some
damage would appear to be implicit.
432 F.2d at 1086, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. l 73,330, at 89,291.
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to the new Massachusetts Act, in which it contended that since the
manufacturers design, engineer and fabricate the vehicles; deliver a
completed product; teach the dealer how to advertise, merchandise
and service the car; make available financing for floor planning and
consumer credit; provide an express warranty to the consumer; train
mechanics, develop repair equipment, provide repair manuals and
supply required parts; the manufacturers, therefore, perform every
service comprised in the term "goodwill."
While conceding that contributions of this scale are basic to the
entire concept of franchising, it would nonetheless seem evident that
the manufacturers are amply compensated for their efforts through
annual net profits exceeding one billion dollars. It also offends common
sense to evaluate at zero a dealer's capital investment in physical
facilities; his purchase of products on a C.O.D. basis; his efforts in
molding an efficient work force of salesmen, mechanics and administra-
tive personnel; his local advertising; his reputation for honest selling
and efficient servicing; and his very ability to survive in a highly inter-
and intra-competitive market.
This dichotomy between manufacturers and dealers on the sub-
ject of goodwill is basic to an appraisal of many manufacturer prac-
tices which could not exist if the dealer's goodwill were recognized.
Historically, manufacturers have asserted a broad right, under the
terms of the franchise agreement, to terminate. or refuse to renew a
dealership. On the same basis, the manufacturers have consistently
asserted the right to restrict the dealer's right to sell, transfer' or
even to capitalize his dealership, and in any event the Big Three have
persistently refused to permit a dealer to sell his dealership at any
price which exceeds the net value of its tangible assets. In accordance
with the manufacturers' adamant position that a dealer's goodwill and
equity in his business have no value, there has been a veritable mush-
rooming of manufacturer-owned retail outlets directly competing with
independent dealers in relevant market areas, and the manufacturers
have exercised an untrammeled prerogative of granting new dealer-
ships in such areas regardless of whether the territory is adequately
serviced by existing dealerships.
From the manufacturer's viewpoint, such absolute negation of the
dealer's goodwill is essential in order to assure complete freedom in
restructuring its marketing complex. Under the cloak of improving
41 This contention was advanced by Ford in Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
42 See American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, .384 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967), in
which the court approved an instruction to the effect that refusal to allow transfer of a
dealership would not of itself give rise to an inference of bad faith under the federal
Dealers' Day in Court Act.
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sales, a manufacturer may unilaterally decide that a particular dealer
should relocate his agency, that another must expand his facilities,
and that a third must cease operations altogether. Alternatively, the
manufacturer may decide that a multiple-brand agency must drop or
establish separate facilities for one of its lines. Although this fre-
quently occurs inter-competitively, it occurs most often intra-com-
petitively. For example, Ford may decide that a Ford-Mercury dealer
must drop one line or establish separate facilities for each line. Or a
dealer handling Chrysler, Peugeot and Toyota, may find the Toyota
factory demanding a separate facility for its brand.
Even assuming that the manufacturer's best interest may justify
such a move, if the dealer is unwilling or unable to accept the change,
he may lose his entire goodwill even though he is without fault.
Further, the manufacturer may err in its judgment or may be moti-
vated by considerations of image rather than considerations of the
direct profitability of the particular change. The manufacturer usually
disregards whether the dealer's profit structure can survive such a
radical change in operations, and this risk must be borne entirely by
the dealer." By denying the very existence of any dealer's goodwill,
the manufacturers need only gamble on having to pay the dealer for
the appraised value of his tangible assets such as vehicles, parts and
equipment, thereby ignoring such factors as goodwill, capital invest-
ment in the physical facilities, or even the value of the auto-leasing
subsidiary frequently operated by dealers. Finally, to discourage the
dealer's resort to litigation in defense of his business, the manufad-
turer's offer of payment for the tangible assets is made conditional
upon the dealer's release of all claims.
These awesome controls are claimed by the factory under a strict
reading of the dealership agreement, an arrangement offered to the
dealer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." The implicit threat that these
43 But cf. Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. 11 73,399, at 89,627 (9th Cir. 1970) (complaint charging elimination of
a distributor by a dominant manufacturer of sealing products should not have been
summarily dismissed since such conduct could be a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, in part because the distributor could be left without the ability to continue in busi-
ness and to distribute other lines).
44 The manufacturer's tremendous leverage in exercising complete control over the
drafting process can redound to its detriment, however. As judge Friendly observed in
the recent case of Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1970):
Ford encounters the rule of "construction against the draftsman," which applies
with particular force "in cases of standardized contracts and in cases where the
drafting party has the stronger bargaining position." ALT, Restatement of Con-
tracts 2d, Tent. Draft No. 5, § 232 at pp. 103-04 (1970)..See also 9 Williston,
Contracts, § 1017A at pp. 162-65 (3rd ed.'1967).
The court also noted that the dealer might also prevail under genera! principles of con-
tract law, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 	 231, comment d (Tent. Draft
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pervasive controls may be invoked by the manufacturer against the
dealer at any time is itself sufficient to vouchsafe to the franchisor-
manufacturers day-to-day superiority in all dealings with their fran-
chisee-dealers.
Finally, it seems evident that fairer dealing between the manu-
facturers and the dealers on such capital matters would in no way
impinge upon consumer protection. On the contrary, guaranteeing
reasonable security, continuity of existence, independence and eco-
nomic stability for the dealers would enhance their ability to fulfill
their customers' requirements.
C. Dealer Complaints Concerning "Administrative Items"
The administrative porcedures by which the foregoing abuses are
perpetuated, including the procedures for handling dealer grievances,
disclose a recurring pattern. For example, each of the Big Three
fosters a program through which a potential dealer who lacks sufficient
funds to open an independent agency may start by purchasing a
minority interest in the dealership with the expectancy of acquiring
the balance through his bonuses and his share of the profits. In fact,
the manufacturers completely dominate the entire operation of such
minority enterprises and maintain them primarily as a readily avail-
able dumping ground for overproduction or factory mistakes. By
relying heavily upon its own vast assets and its guaranteed manufac-
turer's profit on each vehicle, the manufacturer can ignore the need
for profitability in minority retail operations. For example, it can
provide the minority enterprise with physical facilities and equipment
far beyond what the independent dealership can afford; it can indulge
in excessive advertising, salaries and other operating expenses; and it
can even push the sale of vehicles through excessively low prices or
exceedingly generous trade-in allowances to consumers. As for the
minority dealer, his equity interest in the dealership is in extreme
peril where such practices prevail." For the independent dealer at-
No. 5, 1970), or under the Dealers' Day in Court Act on the ground that a contractually
permitted termination was "impermissibly motivated."
In the consumer realm, the courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to enforce
restrictive express automobile warranties against consumers, primarily because of 'the
gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile in-
dustry." See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 391, 161 A.2d 69, 87
(1960).
45 The economic theory underlying the operation of such "company stores" is in-
triguing. Ayres, supra note 6, at 115 reports:
One of the easiest ways to increase market penetration is to sell at a loss. The
trick, of course, is that the loss at retail level Is not as great as the resulting
profit at the wholesale level. With most of the manufacturer's overhead met by
a given volume of sales, the manufacturer's profit on all "extra" units is sub-
stantially larger than the average profit of the preceding units, large enough to
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tempting to compete with such "company stores," the future is ex-
tremely bleak since such dual distribution systems are pregnant with
every conceivable type of anti-competitive abuse."
With regard to record keeping, each manufacturer not only pre-
scribes the forms and bookkeeping procedures to be followed by its
dealers, but also requires that detailed reports be submitted monthly,
and that complete and certified audits be submitted annually. New car
buyers must register their warranties directly with the manufacturer,
giving their own name and address, the dealer's name, the model and
options purchased, and the date of the transaction. All claims against
the manufacturer for pre-delivery and warranty work must be accom-
panied by detailed reports from the dealer. These requirements, com-
bined with requirements for other miscellaneous reports, and the
manufacturer's contractual right to audit the dealer's records, effec-
tively put the manufacturer in possession of every confidential dealer
record, including his itemized customer list. Despite vehement manu-
facturer protestations that such confidential information is kept
segregated from their other divisions, there is little doubt that such
information is used by the manufacturers not only for constant inven-
subsidize the factory store's operating losses and still leave a profit for the manu-
facturer.
Strong arguments have been offered to classify a franchise agreement as an invest-
ment contract and, therefore, a security under existing security laws. See 49 Op. Cal
Att'y Gen. 124 (1967) so ruling; Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise
Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus.
Law. 1311 (1969). Such classification would authorize invocation of the broad proscrip-
tions of the securities laws against fraudulent practices in connection with securities
transactions. Where a dealer purchases a minority stock interest in a dealership, there is
no doubt that he has purchased a "security" and is, therefore, entitled to the full benefit
of SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. f 240.10b-5 (1970) (proscribing manipulative and decep-
tive devices in the sale of a security). See Brown, supra note 11, at 70-76.
46 In February, 1971, large newspaper advertisements in Houston, Texas, offered to
the public all models of one manufacturer at one dollar above the dealer's invoice cost.
Such retail pricing not only guarantees a loss, but inevitably operates to destroy any
independent dealers in the area.
See Ayres, supra note 6, at 115-16, reporting that while market penetration is the
prime goal of each of the Big Three, their secondary motivations are somewhat dis-
parate. G.M., with its present 55% share of the market and its concomitant fear of a
government divestiture drive, should its share of the market materially increase, is
simply "holding the line" until Ford and Chrysler become well enough established for
G.M. to claim that it must expand to meet the burgeoning "competition" of its rivals.
Ford and Chrysler, on the other hand, are fiercely striving to increase their share of the
market and in so doing have employed "company stores" and company-dominated
dealerships to engage in ruthless price cutting without regard for its devastating effect
upon independent dealers in the area or for the retail losses sustained by the company
stores. In this connection, Ayres further observes that:
[T]he double-edged danger of the factory store idea is that after competition
has been destroyed by low prices at the retail level, it would be possible for the
prices to rise with nothing but the good will of the manufacturers and the
porous shield of government regulation to stop them.
Id. at 117.
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tory controls and guidance in production, but also in developing the
market restructuring plans which are repeatedly foisted upon the
dealers. It is difficult to believe that the numerous factory represen-
tatives who swarm over each department of a dealership, including
new car sales, used car sales, parts inventory, repair facilities, adver-
tising and marketing, come to the specific dealership without any of
the information contained in such reports. Moreover, the many abuses
surrounding the operation of minority dealerships suggest a strong
inference that such confidential information is either directly or in-
directly made available to "company stores" selling at retail in direct
competition with independent dealers. 47
On the matter of disciplinary controls, in addition to actual
termination or the equally drastic measure of refusing to renew a
dealership, both of which result in forfeiture of the dealer's entire
goodwill, there is always available to the manufacturers the awesome
coercive power of the threat of termination or non-renewal. While these
disciplinary devices are common to all franchisors, the auto manufac-
turers also have at their disposal an arsenal of other disciplinary
devices, both in the area of punishment and of reward. For example,
an audit for fraudulent warranty reimbursement claims can not only
be internally disruptive, but can go so far as to include personal
interviews with each of the dealer's customers." Approval of reim-
bursement claims for pre-delivery and warranty work can be endlessly
delayed or subjected to reprocessing every ninety days. There may be
discrimination in the delivery of automobiles, either for inventory or
on special order, the same being true for repair parts. On the other
hand, each of these devices can easily be reversed and employed as a
reward in the form of favored treatment in each of these areas.
Money and the extension of credit can also be used for subtle, but
effective, disciplinary control. For example, each manufacturer with-
holds a sum equal to two percent of the dealer's purchases of new
vehicles in the form of a compulsory savings account, the proceeds
of which are remitted to the dealer either annually or quarter-annu-
ally, depending upon the policy of the particular manufacturer. Al-
though such funds belong to the dealer, the manufacturer does not
pay any interest for the period during which it is retained. In addition
to the availability of the fund to guarantee the dealer's open account,
the manufacturer can use it to cover any allegedly fraudulent pre-
delivery or warranty reimbursement claims which it unilaterally may
determine to be due. In addition, during an extended strike or reces-
47 So reported in Ayres, supra note 6, at 129-30.
48 See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970),
in which a dealer sought an injunction against such interviews.
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sional period, the manufacturer may arbitrarily decide which dealers
may be allowed to draw in advance on their own money or even use
it as a collateral pledge for high-interest loans which must be secured
from third parties. The threat of such disciplinary action does not
necessarily suggest the tortious use of force or even overt coercion.
A whispered innuendo that the dealership may be restructured can
terrorize the dealer or, if disclosed by the factory to adjacent dealers,
can virtually destroy the dealership through rumor and attrition. Each
dealer is not only acutely aware of all of these possibilities, but has
seen them actually employed against other dealers or perhaps even
against himself.
Disputes with representatives of the manufacturers and even
with the manufacturers themselves could present a challenge of im-
mense proportions, given the approximate total of 27,000 dealerships
in the nation. The industry has thus come to tolerate both state and
federal associations, to which all dealers may belong, as well as vary-
ing types of "line" associations for dealers handling specific brands.
Some of these associations are sponsored by the manufacturers on an
elected basis and some are formed independently by the dealers
themselves. Although such associations could serve as effective orga-
nizations for independent bargaining with the manufacturers, his-
torically their function has been primarily to provide a forum for the
exchange of ideas and an escape valve for general complaints." Legit-
imate association efforts to achieve any genuine results have generally
encountered endless delays, studies and vacuous results on the manu-
facturers' side. Such associations have, however, gradually achieved
a level of accomplishment in obtaining remedial legislation in a grow-
ing number of states. In the past two years there has been a growing
crescendo of demands by dealers, the latest being in the area of objec-
tion to the subsidies to fleet and leasing companies. In some instances
such associations have even provided financial support for test litiga-
tion.
As for specific grievance procedures, one manufacturer provides
a "Policy Board" of company executives, to which any dispute may
ultimately be taken, and all hearings are held in the Detroit home
office. As a matter of cost, convenience and availability of witnesses,
4D In a variety of ways, the manufacturers attempt to subvert dealers who are
elected to Dealer Councils. In Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d at 1199
n.2, the court noted that Ford admitted that until 1969 it had a "policy" against auditing
dealers who were members of the Ford National Dealer Council. The author knows of
one instance in the Fall of 1970 in which another of the Big Three promised to a newly-
elected Dealer Council member 500 cars of a very desirable model at a time when most
dealers could obtain only three or four cars of this model. Wining and dining in Detroit,
with a concentrated indoctrination in the manufacturer's viewpoint, is also frequently
employed by the manufacturers in seeking friends among the Dealer Councils.
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it is rather obvious that the ordinary dealer, let alone one who has
been hard pressed economically, cannot afford such pilgrimages. Be-
cause of the desultory results of almost all such hearings, that manu-
facturer has recently activated a highly-advertised hearings procedure
at the regional level before a board of dealers selected from the
Dealers Council. It is unknown whether the Policy Board will respect
the decisions of such panels since the manufacturer has declined to
state publicly its position on this question. However, in all such
proceedings the manufacturer in question prohibits a dealer from
being represented by counsel at any hearing.
For several years, a second member of the Big Three has widely
advertised its good intentions, its fairness and the legality of its treat-
ment of dealers through a so-called "Umpire Plan" or "one-way"
arbitration procedure. The final arbiter is a retired Supreme Court
Justice, selected and paid by the manufacturer, and all hearings are
conducted in Missouri, supposedly as a centralized geographical con-
venience. The one-way aspect arises from the manufacturer's absolute
commitment to be bound by the arbiter's decision, while the dealer
is not so bound. However, because of an almost uninterrupted series
of findings in favor of the manufacturer," the procedure is now being
seriously questioned. At the first level are the same questions of cost,
convenience and availability of witnesses, even though the Missouri
location may provide a modicum of relief in these areas. But far more
basic is the manufacturer's inherent ability to mislead the dealer as
to the issues which may be submitted to arbitration and as to the
standards which will be applied by the Umpire in resolving those
issues. For the most part, the primary standard applied in such pro-
ceedings has been "sanctity of the contract," and the proceedings have
focused only upon the narrow contractual provisions applicable to a
specific dispute. As demonstrated by the prior discussion of the broad
range of dealer complaints, there are numerous questions involved in
. most dealer disputes, including such questions as the potential appli-
cability of the antitrust laws as well as the viability of the newly-
developing theory, discussed infra," that the manufacturer has fi-
duciary obligations to its dealers. The heart of the problem lies in the
fact that the application of such legal standards transcends the con-
an Of the 20 appeals decided up to December 7, 1970, all but one were in favor of
the manufacturer. Letter of Ross L. Malone, Vice President and General Counsel of
General Motors Corp. to Harold Brown, Feb. 24, 1971, on file at the offices of the Boston
College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. The only successful appeal involved a
dealer's request to transfer the dealership to his son. The present Umpire has never
decided in favor of a dealer. Further, the manufacturer has adamantly refused to arbitrate
a dealer's claim of favoritism in the allotment of vehicles.
51 See discussion on p. 779 infra.
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tract and requires an examination of economic realties and other
extrinsic factors, but such extrinsic factors receive no consideration
by the Umpire in the one-way arbitration proceedings.
Naturally, the dealer is theoretically free to litigate his rights,
principally in treble damage class antitrust suits. 52 However, aside
from the dealer's obviously difficult position in resorting to litigation
while the contractual relationship with the manufacturer still exists,
it is well known that legal proceedings can be quite lengthy and very
costly, with expenses of over $100,000 being common, and with the
possibility of expending as much as $500,000 if there are protracted
trials and appeals.53 Moreover, litigation is at best a precarious ven-
ture. The recent sponsoring of test litigation by the National Auto-
mobile Dealers Association on the issue of subsidies to leasing and
fleet buyers, has led to the manufacturer's counterclaim that such
financial support itself constitutes a combination in restraint of
trade." In the recent case of Halverson v. Convenience Food Mart,
Inc.," after ten months of unsuccessful bargaining with a franchisor,
a franchisees' association notified its members of the need to litigate,
and requested their participation and financial support. When these
facts were disclosed at a preliminary hearing, the court dismissed the
suit on the merits and referred to the Illinois Bar Association a com-
plaint against the association's attorney for his participation in alleged
solicitation." Yet, the small businessman's need for legal protection
is so desperate, and the public policy favoring private enforcement of
the antitrust laws is so strong," that Senator Philip Hart, Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, has suggested
that the Small Business Administration should make loans to small
businessmen to finance meritorious antitrust claims. 58
Unless the availability of relief in the form of a class antitrust
52
 As authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23.
Ga Without any trial on the merits, legal fees and costs of $157,000 were involved
in Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970). These ex-
penses covered extensive pretrial motions on numerous affidavits and a circuit court
appeal, principally from the granting of a temporary injunction against termination. Car
Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, vol. V, no. 8, Dec. 7, 1970, at 4.
54 Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., Civil No. 2000-70 (D.D.C., filed July 22,
1970). Actual or threatened litigation has been recognized as a tool which can be used
in furtherance of monopolistic practices. See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 321 F. Supp.
1095, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 73,471 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
G 5 Civil No. 70C-499 (N.D. III., filed March 3, 1970).
50 But cf. Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. R 73,399, at 89,629-630 (9th Cir. 1970), regarding the rule for sparing
the use of dismissal as a means of enforcing a court's order.
57 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947).
58 Release by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Sept. 16, 1968.
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suit is to be wholly illusory, thereby, at least arguably, denying the
franchisee due process of law, some reasonable means must be found
to permit notification of a class antitrust suit to other members of the
class, and some acceptable method of requesting each member of the
class to bear his share of the legal costs must be devised. In an effort
to meet this need, the author has submitted to the Judicial Conference
of the United States a proposal that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Rules for Multidistrict Litigation be amended to
permit notification of all members of a class concerning the pendency
of a class suit and the terms for sharing of legal costs, subject at all
times to court supervision." While avoiding direct solicitation, such
a rule would afford each member of the class a fair opportunity to
participate in the suit and to bear his proportionate share of the cost.
It is apparent that without the financial support of an association or
of others in the class, the individual franchisee cannot conceivably
hope to retain competent antitrust counsel, since none but the most
courageous of advocates would embark upon such protracted litigation
on a wholly contingent fee basis. Given the financial realities of anti-
trust litigation, there is strong reason to believe that it is precisely
this obstacle upon which many franchisors rely as a shield for their
blatant disregard of the antitrust laws.
See B. Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means 78-79 (American Bar
Found. 1970), reviewed, Brown & Cohen, 5 Valparaiso L. Rev. — (1971):
The ideal of the American legal system is equal justice under law. . . . [Title
fact is that as the litigative system now functions, equal justice can be had only
if both sides to the dispute are fully represented by competent counsel.
If all litigants are to be equal, ... then no litigants can be "more equal" than
others.
In response to the suggestion that "stirring up" social litigation constitutes barratry,
Christensen comments:
While the stirring up of frivolous or fraudulent claims is undoubtedly evil, the
stirring up of legitimate claims that would otherwise go unasserted because of
the prospective claimants' poverty, weakness, ignorance, or naivete may in fact
be a positive good.
Id. at 145.
In the past, the Supreme Court has permitted jointly sponsored litigation under the
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964); United Mine Workers of America, Dist.
12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). Given the prerogative of an antitrust
specialist to litigate antitrust matters in any state, as recognized in Spanos v. Skouras
Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd on rehearing in bane, 364 F.2d 168,
aff'g 235 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966), it would appear
that appellate courts have manifested a clear disposition toward encouraging the joint
assertion of rights by those of limited financial means. See § 10 of the new Massachusetts
Auto Dealers' Act, granting dealers the right of free association "for any lawful purpose."
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 10 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
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II. THE PRIOR STATE OF THE LAW GOVERNING
MANUFACTURER-DEALER RELATIONSHIPS
Rather than attempt the impossible task of discussing all of the
laws which governed the relationship between auto manufacturers
and their dealers prior to enactment of the Massachusetts Act, it will
suffice for present purposes to review them descriptively, with selec-
tive analysis of certain highlights. The most significant elements of the
prior law in this area are longstanding common law principles, chiefly
in equity, the antitrust laws,°° the Federal Trade Commission Act,° 1
the "Baby" FTC Act, 82 and the federal "Dealers' Day in Court
Act."°8
 Except for the last named statute, none of these laws addressed
the special problems of franchising. Auto dealerships, as well as gaso-
line service stations, substantially antedated the surge of franchising
after World War II, with the result that much of the doctrinaire ap-
proach to the franchising problem involved those two industries. Only
recently has there been a serious effort to discern the precise nature
of the franchising relationship and to find appropriate remedies in
existing law. That process is necessarily slow and expensive, and it has
become increasingly apparent that legislation is needed to meet the
challenge effectively. Given the scope of the legal problems, it is
evident that no more than an initial analysis is possible, it being
incumbent upon counsel to exhaust the source materials applicable to
specific issues. This is no easy task, however, and the challenge is
compounded by the fact that few practitioners or even courts have
had the opportunity to obtain broad experience on many of these
issues.
A. The Common Law and the U.C.C.
At common law, it was fairly well established that mere termina-
tion or failure to renew a dealership was not actionable so long as the
contractually prescribed procedUres were observed.° 4
 Such cases reflect
the standard common law view that there is no requirement of "corn-
6° Generally including the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44
(1964) ; and related measures.
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
02
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1971).
03 15 U.S.C. §11 1221-225 (1964).
64 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933);
Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966). See H.
Brown, Franchising: Trap for the Trusting 79 n.4 (2d printing 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Brown], For one of the most recent cases involving a gasoline station dealer, see
Division of the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.2d 720, 304 N.Y.S,2d
191 (1969).
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passion" in the enforcement of a contract. 65 Yet without much discus-
sion of its radical departure from that view, a recent Massachusetts
case awarded damages for the "bad faith" termination of an exclusive
territorial distributorship where the manufacturer terminated imme-
diately prior to submitting a successful bid on a government contract
scheduled to be awarded in the dealer's territory." Although the
court was obviously responding to the foul play involved in a termina-
tion designed to avoid payment of a substantial commission, with
disarming simplicity it ignored its prior holdings, only recently re-
affirmed, that unless there has been fraud in the inducement, a party
who signs an agreement "is bound by its terms."'" In any event, the
decision offers some promise that upon presentation of the full scope
of the abuses inherent in franchising, the courts will respond appro-
priately. In this particular case, the court devoted no attention to
either the intricacies of franchising or the dynamic forces involved,
but rather rested its damage award solely on bad faith. Of greater
significance are the questions left unanswered by the court regarding
the extent to which this case may portend the application of the full
powers of equity to all aspects of franchising.
Although the Uniform Commercial Code was not enacted with
franchising specifically in mind, nonetheless it has been suggested that
certain of its provisions could afford a source of relief to franchisees.
Of potential applicability in this connection are the Code's require-
ments of "good faith" and "conscionability" in contracts to supply
all of the buyer's requirements," the standard of "best efforts" by the
parties to such exclusive dealing arrangements," as well as the "rea-
sonable time" standard for the duration of such contracts when no
specific duration is provided," and the requirement that "reasonable
notice" be given before termination of such agreements.'" The diffi-
culty in persuading a court to acknowledge the standard of good faith
05
 See, e.g., Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930); Division
of the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.2d 720, 727, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191,
199 (1969) (recognizing implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing only "during
the term of the contract unless the relationship is continued beyond the expiration
date.") ; 9 Williston on Contracts	 1017A at 153-57 (3rd ed. 1967); cf. SA Corbin on
Contracts	 1229 (1964). See generally Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and
the Code—Mixing Classified and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. Law.
1075 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Hewitt]; Brown, Franchising: A Fiduciary Relation-
ship, 49 Texas L. Rev. — (1971).
06
 RLM Associates, Inc. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., — Mass. —, 248 N.E.2d 646 (1969).
07 Gifford v. Gifford, 354 Mass. 247, 248, 236 N.E.2d 892, 893 (1968).
08 U.C.C. f§ 2-306, -302. All U.C.C. references will be to the 1962 Official Text
unless otherwise indicated.
09 U.C.C. § 2-306.
7° U.C.C. 1 2-309(2).
71 U.C.C. § 2-309(3). See also Leff, Unconstionability and the Code—The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. Fa. L. Rev. 485 (1967); Hewitt, supra note 65.
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in the termination of a dealership, even with the aid of such U.C.C.
requirements, is exemplified in a recent New York case involving a
gasoline service station." In a lengthy opinion displaying an obvious
effort to find such a source of relief, the court felt constrained by
prior law to rule that the common law did not require good faith and,
since the service station dealership was intimately a part of the sub-
lease of the premises, that the U.C.C.'s applicability only to personal
property precluded its applicability in this instance. The sympathetic
disposition of the court was best demonstrated in its concluding direc-
tion that the opinion be transmitted to the New York legislative
committees then considering generic relief for all franchisees."
This author has long contended that a full and proper under-
standing of franchising and its problems would result in recognition
of the need to apply fiduciary standards not only during the relation-
ship and in the context of attempted termination, but also at its very
inception when the franchise is being granted or sold.' Such stan-
dards should be invoked particularly because of the gross imbalance
between the parties to the typically complex and enduring franchising
agreement, with virtually total power vested in the franchisor to con-
trol every aspect of the franchisee's activity, including access to his
most confidential records. Because auto dealers in particular must
rely completely on the manufacturer for continuity in the supply of
new vehicles, they are constrained to repose their faith in the manu-
facturer. The latter is not only aware of that reliance, but in fact
insists upon it. That very combination of elements has already been
recognized by some courts as a source of quasi-fiduciary obligations."
Although no American court has specifically considered whether there
are fiduciary obligations inherent in franchising, in a case of first
impression, a Toronto, Canada, trial court found no difficulty in apply-
ing such well established concepts to. this new relationship." After a
painstaking analysis of the extensive controls exercised by the fran-
chisor, that court required restitution to the franchisees of fees paid
to the franchisor by third party vendors from whom the franchisees
were required to purchase products and services.
Although fraud in the inducement has seldom been charged
against the auto manufacturers, the preceding recitation of dealer
72 Division of the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.2d 720, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
73 Id. at 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
74 See Brown, supra note 64, at 41-44; Brown, Franchising: A Fiduciary Relation-
ship, 49 Texas L. Rev. — (1971).
75 Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965) ; Meinhard v.
Sahnon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
78 Jirna, Ltd. v, Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd., 3 Ont. 629 (1970) (now being
appealed).
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complaints suggests that the manufacturers may not, in fact, be mak-
ing full disclosure to their dealers when such dealerships are granted.
If fiduciary obligations should be found to exist at the very inception
of the franchising relationship, it would follow that there is an affirma-
tive duty to disclose all relevant data." Arguably, concealment of such
data would toll the statute of 'imitations" or, if the suit be equitable
in nature, the doctrine of laches should not bar recovery. In the
final analysis, although a significant trend in favor of protecting
franchisees can be discerned in the common law, the auto dealer can
hardly rely upon such protection with substantial confidence. With
their entire investment at stake, it is not surprising that dealers have
generally elected to continue yielding to the awesome economic power
of the manufacturers.
B. Federal Law
In the realm of federal law, almost every one of the dealer's
complaints may eventually be found to constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws," the Federal Trade Commission Act," or the federal
Dealers' Day in Court Act."
1. The Antitrust Laws
The principal statutory provisions of the various antitrust laws
contain deceptively simple prohibitions against:
a. Any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade; 82
b. Any monopolization or attempt to monopolize, or any con-
spiracy or combination to monopolize trade;"
c. Any direct or indirect discrimination in the price of commod-
ities;" and
d. Any exclusive supply understandings."
77 See Reed v. A.E. Little Co., 256 Mass. 442, 152 N.E. 918 (1926).
78
 For such a tolling provision see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 12 (1959).
79 Including the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
H 12-22, 27 (1964); the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. H 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964); and
related measures.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
81 15 U.S.C. H 1221-225 (1964).
82 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
83 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
84 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). Section 13 also includes the often overlooked subsec-
tion (f), which makes it unlawful "to induce or receive" such price discrimination.
85 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). This section specifically prohibits making the sale or lease
of a commodity, or the establishment of a price, or the granting of a discount, condi-
tional upon the buyer's agreement not to deal in competitive commodities, if the effect
of such an agreement may be to substantially lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly.
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Quite early, however, the proscriptions of the Sherman Act were
made subordinate to the "rule of reason," 8° thus opening the door for
evolution of its statutory terms" through an array of judicial inter-
pretations, a process which in the past few years has witnessed nu-
merous milestone Supreme Court decisions." Such judge-made law
has gradually developed various categories of "per se" violations, as
to which practically no economic justification will be accepted, in
contrast to practices which may be justified through extensive analysis
of underlying economic considerations.
In the per se category are such violations as resale price main-
tenance, including both minimum and maximum price setting;"
territorial exclusivity, whether horizontal or vertical;" tying sales;"
8° Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
87 For discussion of these laws as applied to franchising, see Brown, supra note 64,
at 45-69 and particularly as to the automobile industry at 77-86; The Franchising
Sourcebook (2 P.L.I. Commercial Law and Practice Sourcebook Series) (J. McCord ed.
1970) [refer generally to the index under the heading "Automobile Industry"]; Fran-
chising—Today's Legal and Business Problems (2 P.L.I. Commercial Law and Practice
Transcript Series) (L. Ratner ed. 1970); The Realities of Franchising, A Guide for the
Practicing Attorney (Mass. Continuing Legal Education, Inc. ed., Faneuil Press 1970)
[hereinafter cited as The Realities of Franchising]; Primer on Unlawful Restraints in
Marketing and Distribution, Proceedings of the First Annual New England Antitrust
Conference (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc. 1967). For a basic discussion of the anti-
trust laws, see generally Antitrust Developments 1955-1968 (A.B.A. 1968) ; J. VanCise,
Understanding the Antitrust Laws (P.L.I. rev. ed. 1970).
88 Significantly, in the last twelve antitrust appeals, the Supreme Court has reversed
a circuit court to rule in favor of recovery. While these decisions suggest a dynamically
developing trend toward application of the antitrust laws to a burgeoning variety of
arrangements and transactions, the fact that each of these cases required a lengthy and
incredibly expensive Supreme Court appeal in itself serves as an interesting commentary
on the tenacity and resources which may be required in order to prosecute an antitrust
claim successfully. The twelve decisions in question have each contained a full review
of the prior state of the antitrust law, and their examination should provide a tailor-
made course covering most of the crucial issues in the antitrust field.
BO Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke-Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). But cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
9° United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The auto industry's shift to
"primary area of responsibility" has yet to be ruled on, since the Supreme Court did
not reach the issue in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 139-40
(1966); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963) ; or United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967). Upon remand to the district court,
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. entered into a final consent decree which, although including
"primary area of responsibility," was accepted by the government. 1968 Trade Cas.
11 72,480 (N.D. III. 1968).
91 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). In
this case, credit was found to be a tying product when it would not be extended unless
the debtor agreed to purchase prefabricated homes manufactured by the creditor. See
the dissenting opinion of Justices Fortas and Stewart with respect to the potential
applicability of the Court's decision to franchising. Id. at 524-25. See Northern Pee. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (in which the granting of leases on farmland
was found to be a tying product when such leases would not be granted unless the
lessees agreed to ship their products via the lessor railroad).
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boycotts;" full-line forcing;" and, most recently, any customer or
territorial restraint on the alienation of products owned by a dealer."
Even so, the discernment of such violations may be a complicated
process, as evidenced by United States v. General Motors Corp.,"
in which the Supreme Court found a classic pricing conspiracy, revers-
ing the trial court's finding after months of litigation that there
was no violation. Certain exceptions have been engrafted even on
per se violations, such as the "new company" or "failing company"
exceptions for territorial exclusivity," or the exception to "tying sales"
where the several products may be found to be a single unit," Or where
the seller can establish the need of the tied product to insure the
quality of the tying product."
In franchising, some of the most important antitrust violations
are in the area of exclusive dealing arrangements, prohibited under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act," and in the area of price discrimination,
banned by the Robinson-Patman Act.'" It has been aptly noted that
the exclusive dealing statute was addressed to incipient violations of
the Sherman Act, requiring only a showing that the practice may sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.'" In sub-
stance, a violation will be found whenever potential third party
vendors may experience unreasonable difficulty in selling their goods
92 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (boycott by
manufacturers and other distributor retail outlets against individual retailer held a per
se violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, regardless of the fact that only one
small retailer was boycotted).
1)9 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
94 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
95 384 U.S. 127 (1966). The case involved a combination by the manufacturers and
several dealer associations directed against price-cutting dealers. Similarly, the Supreme
Court's per se finding with respect to territorial exclusivity in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), followed by only four years the Court's calling for
a full trial to adduce more economic data on the identical issue in White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
99 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (the "new company" exception); Sandura Co. v.
FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (the "failing company" exception).
97 See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc., 270 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
98 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co.,
58 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961); Susser v. Carve' Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for
cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Engbrecbt v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714
(D. Kan. 1962).
99 15 U.S.C.	 14 (1964).
100 15 U.S.C.	 13, I3a-c, 21a (1964).
101 See the comments of Attorney John Curtin, Jr., in The Realities of Franchising,
supra note 87, at 28.
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to dealers,'" provided a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce is
involved.'" Even so, the arrangement may be allowed as an "all re-
quirements" agreement in which the arrangement is primarily to
satisfy the economic needs of the buyer and is of limited duration."4
Notwithstanding the high incidence of both "tying" sales and
"exclusive supply" contracts in the area of franchising, it should be
noted that such arrangements have not yet been characterized as per
se violations of the antitrust laws.'" However, such violations will be
found if the franchisor is unsuccessful in justifying the arrangement
on the grounds that specification in the franchising agreement of a
substitute for the tied product would be so detailed that the product
could not practically be obtained elsewhere.'" Perhaps of equal
significance, the franchise trademark itself may be the "tying prod-
uct,"'" a result consonant with the Supreme Court's recent decision
recognizing the extension of credit as such a "product."'"
Since the Robinson-Patman Act prohibition of price discrimina-
tion is confined to "commodities,""° it will be interesting to learn
whether such decisions as those just discussed portend an ultimate
finding that a franchise is a "commodity." Such a ruling would re-
quire elimination of the widespread disparity in the prices charged
by many franchisors to their various franchisees since, as noted
earlier, the Robinson-Patman Act contains a general prohibition
against engaging in price discrimination, as well as a prohibition
against "inducing" or "receiving" such discrimination."°
Procedurally, both the statutes and the courts have done much
to support the strong public policy against anti-competitive devices
by encouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Under the
"2
 L.G. Balfour Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. if 18,485 (FTC
1968).
1 °3
 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969);
International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
104 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (20-year require-
ments contract sustained despite the length of its duration, where buyer needed assurance
of a constant supply of coal).
105 See Susser v. Carve! Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965), in which the plaintiff franchisee stipulated that it was relying
solely upon per se violations of the antitrust laws and the court found that no per se
violation existed.
100 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (holding
that no evidence for such justification would even be allowed as to paper goods, supplies
and certain equipment). Further, in that case, the jury specially found no justification
for the franchisor's requirement that allegedly "secret" dip and spice mixes and certain
cookers and fryers be purchased solely from the franchisor to insure "quality control."
107 Id. at 489; Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for
cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
108
 Fortner Enterprise; Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
100
 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
1" See note 84 supra.
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Clayton Act there are provisions for recovery of treble damages and
attorney fees,'" for the issuance of injunctions against violators,'
and for the introduction of a final judgment or decree, rendered in any
contested civil or criminal action brought by the United States for
enforcement of the antitrust laws, as prima fade evidence of violation
in any subsequent action brought by a private party against the same
defendant. 113
 In addition, the four-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to private antitrust actions is suspended during the pendency of
a government suit." 4 To this must be added the formidable threat
of a class suit where the prospective plaintiffs qualify for participation
in such a suit,'" and common questions of law and fact predominate
in their claims.'"
In regard to proof of damages in antitrust actions, the Supreme
Court, in the interest of aiding plaintiffs, has held sufficient "a just and
reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data," even
though such conclusions are admittedly only approximations.'" Fur-
thermore, although the defendant is still permitted to show that other
factors may have produced the plaintiff's damages, the defendant
bears the burden of proof on this question.'" Recently, the Supreme
Court has ruled that pari delicto is not a defense in antitrust actions,
although it may mitigate the amount of damages.'" Finally, following
its established principle that in interpreting the antitrust laws "[IN] e
must look at the economic reality of the relevant transactions,'"
the Supreme Court, in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,'" found no diffi-
culty in penetrating several distributor "levels" in order to unearth an
antitrust violation at a lower level, even though none of the distributors
lit 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
112 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
its 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
114 15 U.S.C. § 16(h) (1964).
115 See the requirements in F.R. Civ. P. 23.
110 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 727-28 (ND. CO. 1967);
Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., — F. Supp. Civil No. 295-70-A (E.D. Va., decided
April 12, 1971).
117 Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931); Flintkote Co. v.
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 391 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957) ; Washing-
ton State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 379 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966). See generally Comment, Private Treble Damage
Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part of a Business,•80
Harv. L. Rev. 1566 (1967).
115 Cf. Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
110 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
120 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 208
(1968).
121 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
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in the chain of supply were wholly-owned subsidaries of the defendant
producer. 122
Even this brief overview of the antitrust laws would suggest that
many of the current practices followed by the major auto manufac-
turers could constitute serious antitrust violations. But since those
laws are addressed solely to anti-competitive practices, it is necessary
to interpret the dealers' complaints not merely in terms of the un-
conscionability of the practices complained of, but particularly in
terms of their effect upon competition. For example, inadequate
compensation for pre-delivery and warranty work could constitute
a compulsory discount in violation of the resale price maintenance
proscription embodied in Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'" The same
may be true if the manufacturer unilaterally advertises a sale in which
no charge will be made for an optional power steering unit, without
granting its dealers an equivalent reduction in the wholesale cost for
each vehicle so equipped. The manufacturer's outright prohibition
against selling a dealership at a price above tangible asset value would
also appear to be unlawful resale price maintenance. The numerous
ways in which the dealer's equity and business goodwill are subject
to forfeiture may constitute an illegal restraint on alienation of the
dealer's intangible assets,' Discrepancies between the price and ser-
vice allowances granted to leasing and fleet buyers, and those granted
to dealers may constitute violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, 126
not only by the manufacturers but also by those leasing companies
which could be found to have induced such price discriminations. 12°
If it can be shown that the factory has an express agreement with its
supplier of "captive" parts whereby the latter agrees not to sell di-
rectly to dealers or to independent auto body repair shops, such an
agreement could constitute an illegal boycott!" Similarly, the numer-
ous complaints involving tying sales, exclusive supply requirements,
full-line forcing, excessive quotas and terminations without due
cause would probably, by themselves, constitute actionable violations,
and would undoubtedly be actionable if shown to be in furtherance
of other major violations.
Given the gravity of the complaints against three of the nation's
six largest corporations, as well as the dramatic decrease in the num-
ber of auto dealers, from 49,000 to 27,000 since World War II,
there is considerable cause to wonder at the paucity of both public
122 See the chain of supply detailed in id. at 647-48.
123 15 U.S.C.	 1 (1964). See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
124 Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
125 15 U.S.C. § 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
120 See 15 U.S.C.	 13(f) (1964).
127 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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and private litigation against the major automakers. Very recently
several suits have been instituted,'" but final decisions in those suits
may be a decade or more away.'" Undoubtedly, the enormous expense
of antitrust suits has been a major deterrent to litigation, though in
the public arena both political pressures and possible effects on the
national economy have played a major role in discouraging enforce-
ment by the federal government."° It is reported that for several
years the government has procrastinated in bringing divestiture actions
against both Ford and General Motors to require each company to
divide into several independent companies."' Although such action
would provide no restrictions on specific practices nor offer compensa-
tion for past violations, theoretically it would foster the competition
which the antitrust laws were primarily designed to protect.'"
Elimination of the concentrated power of the Big Three would
produce a result much like that encouraged by the Supreme Court
with respect to the "discount department store" auto dealers involved
in United States v. General Motors, Inc.'" In that case, the discount
dealers maintained multiple-brand dealerships, purchasing surplus
vehicles from regular dealers and reselling them at substantial dis-
counts. When other regular dealers complained, General Motors
pressured the offending dealers to refuse to sell to the discount dealer-
ships. The Supreme Court found this to be a classic conspiracy to
maintain prices. The Court's decision fails to point up the fact that
multiple-brand dealerships would actually promote competition by
considerably lessening the stranglehold which the manufacturers are
128 See, e.g., DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., Civil No. 704331 (ED. Pa., filed
Dec. 3, 1970).
129 After twelve years of litigation and two favorable rulings by the Supreme Court,
the case of Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), has just reached a conclusion
through settlement.
139 See E. Ayres, What's Good for GM 213 (Aurora 1970), noting the political
parsimony which persuaded both Presidents Johnson and Nixon in blocking antitrust
divestiture actions against General Motors. Although the major auto makers have "subsi-
dized" leasing and fleet buyers for years through a variety of devices, including those
discussed supra at pp. 763-64, only recently the Justice Department announced the con-
vening of a federal grand jury to investigate this situation. Trade Regulation Reports,
no. 506, Feb. 22, 1971, at 6.
131 See New York Times, Dec. 24, 1970, at 26, col. 1, reporting on Ralph Nader's
letter to Senator Philip A. Hart, complaining of the fact that major divestiture suits
against both Ford and General Motors, based in part upon acquisitions and mergers
dating from the 1920's and also upon restrictive franchising practices, have lain idle in
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice for four years. See the counter-view
of Senator Hart that vertical break-ups might be more effective, requiring severance of
wholly-owned suppliers of raw materials or forcing divestiture of company-owned or
franchised dealerships, thus giving a new competitor a more readily available supply of
customers. Trade Regulation Reports, no. 506. Feb. 22, 1971, at 4.
132
 See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
133 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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able to maintain on their dealers through their complete control over
the dealers' continued source of supply. 1" Although generally any
seller may decline to do business with whomever he desires, under the
antitrust laws, such refusal is actionable if in furtherance of another
antitrust violation or if the result of combined activity by two or more
parties. In remedying such violations, a court may order a seller to
deal with a particular party as part of a prophylactic decree.
2. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act (F.T.C.A.) 1" created the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as an independent administrative
agency with multiple functions, its principal role being to aid in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws through cease and desist orders
enforceable through the courts.'" Although the FTC was not designed
as a forum for private relief, there has been a recent trend to order
restitution to injured parties as part of its orders.'" The statutory
standard governing its efforts is as deceptively simple as the standards
set forth in the antitrust laws, namely, "[u]nf air methods of competi-
tion in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are declared unlawful."'" Although the FTC may use the
antitrust laws as guidelines, it has flexibly employed this sweeping
prohibition of the F.T.C.A. in attempting to reach a panoply of ever-
changing business practices,'" and has recently invoked it to proscribe
certain types of activity even more "incipient" than the practices
sought to be reached by the Clayton Act.'"
134 A $10 billion suit has recently been filed against General Motors and the other
manufacturers alleging a combination to refuse to sell to discount dealers, as well as
price fixing through fictitious freight charges in order to equalize the delivered prices to
dealers. See National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 70C-5421
(5.1/N.Y., filed December 10, 1970).
135 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964), enacted as a supplement to, although not technically
a part of, the antitrust Iaws. See 15 'U.S.C. § 12 (1964), defining "antitrust laws," but
not including the Federal Trade Commission Act within that definition.
180 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b)-(1). Subsection (1) prescribes that each violation shall give
rise to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 payable to the United States.
137 Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. If 19,371 (FTC 1970)
(ordering restitution to persons who spent money in reliance on alleged misrepresenta-
tions in connection with a credit card franchising plan).
158 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
130 See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (deceptive tele-
vision advertising); LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (leasing and sale of
machinery) ; Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1966) (tying arrangement for sale of tires, batteries and accessories by gasoline
stations); Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 401 U.S. — (1971), 39 U.S.L.W. 3419 (Mar. 31, 1971) (unsuccessful attempt
to apply the Act to a trading stamp company which was attempting to prevent other
parties from "trafficking" in its trading stamps).
140 See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384, U.S. 316 (1966) (exclusive dealing agree-
ment between shoe manufacturer and its franchisees).
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Although many of the FTC's decisions have had primary impact
upon other industries employing the franchise system of marketin g,141
its recent activity has concerned matters directly affecting the auto-
mobile industry. Perhaps the most significant of these recent decisions
is FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. 142
 In this case, the FTC found that
the nation's second largest shoe manufacturer had violated Section 5
of the F.T.C.A.143
 by virtue of its contractual arrangement with its
dealers whereby the dealers were to purchase Brown shoes exclusively
over conflicting lines, and were to give them preferential display and
inventory space. In return, the dealers were to receive such benefits as
use of Brown's architectural plans, merchandising record systems,
participation in low-cost group insurance, and the free services of its
field representatives. Without even mentioning the word "franchising"
the Supreme Court sustained the FTC's finding that a requirement to
deal exclusively in the manufacturer's products was an incipient viola-
tion of both Section 1 of the Sherman Act"' and Section 3 of the Clay-
ton Ace' and expressly recognized the FTC's power to find a violation
of Section 5 of the F.T.C.A., even absent a finding that either the
Sherman Act or the Clayton Act had been violated.'"
Even more pertinent to franchising was the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in sustaining the FTC's cease and desist order against
Texaco"' for inducing its gasoline station dealers to purchase tires,
batteries and accessories from sources designated by Texaco, and
which paid Texaco commissions on their sales to Texaco dealers.
Despite the complete absence of any overt evidence of coercion, the
Court found such coercion inherent in the combination of Texaco's
dominant economic power, the dealers' total reliance on Texaco for
continuity of supplies, and the dealers' realization that unless they did
what was expected of them, their short-term dealerships would not be
renewed. In thus finding the requisite "combination" in restraint of
trade, the Court recognized the implicit threat of termination or failure
to renew the dealership, which forms the basis of the extensive control
available to every franchisor on a daily basis.
141 See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 382 U.S.
873 (1965) (commissions obtained from third party vendors of tires. batteries and ac-
cessories); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (commissions from third party
vendors prohibited even in absence of overt coercion, since the dominant economic power
of the manufacturer is "inherently coercive"); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341
(1968) (price discrimination where grocery wholesalers were not granted the same pro-
motional allowances as direct-buying retailers).
142 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
143 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
144 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
14s 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
140 384 U.S. at 321-22.
147 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
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Of particular importance in the franchising context is the second
aspect of the F.T.C.A. declaring unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices."'" While in the past this standard has been employed
primarily against deceptive advertising of products and services, it
has recently been invoked in franchising situations, not only against
deceptive advertising in the sale of franchises,'" but also in an at-
tempt to hold a franchisor responsible for fraudulent practices perpe-
trated by its franchisees against consumers. In Aamco Automatic
Transmissions, Inc.,'" the first such case brought by the FTC against
a franchisor, the complaint alleged that the unfair practices in ques-
tion were part of the franchisor's instructions to the franchisees and
that the latter were subject to default unless they complied. Among
the unfair practices alleged were failure to advise consumers that a
"free examination" of a transmission did not include free re-assembly
unless a purchase was made, and of the fact that a rebuilding job
might be done with used parts. The case was recently concluded with
the acceptance by the FTC of a consent order prohibiting Aamco from
engaging in any of the practices alleged, and requiring Aamco to
deliver a copy of the order to all present and future franchisees and
to obtain their agreement in writing to abide by its terms, 151 In this
sense, many consumer complaints against automobile dealers may well
involve liability on the part of the automobile manufacturers as well. 152
145 15 U.S.C.	 45(a)(1) (1964).
142 Meal or Snack System, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
11 18,671 (FTC 1970) (consent order arising out of alleged misrepresentation in the sale
of fast-food franchises) ; Success Motivation Institute, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. If 19,306
(FTC 1970) (consent order arising out of alleged misrepresentation in the sale of self-
improvement academy franchises); Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. If 19,371 (FTC 1970) (complaint issued alleging misrepresentation in the sale of
a credit card franchising plan); Century Brick Corp. of America, 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
If 19,391 (FTC 1970) (consent order whereby franchisors of simulated brick and floor
covering distributorships were prohibited from recruiting franchisees through misrepresen-
tation).
On May 8, 1969, FTC Commissioner Everette Maclntyre commented in an address
before the Conference of International Franchise Associations in Washington, D.C.:
Too often the franchisor will regale potential franchisees with exaggerated
claims about prospective earnings and the extent of management training and
assistance they will receive from the franchisor. I believe that not only must the
franchisor give accurate information about his franchise system, but that he
also has the affirmative duty to reveal any unfavorable news concerning his
system. For example, if the Commission or a state attorney general has brought
an action against the franchisor, of if a group of franchisees have brought a
class action against the franchisor, this information should be brought to the
attention of the potential franchisee.
5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 50,240, at 55,486 (1969).
150 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 19,283 (FTC 1970).
151 3 Trade Reg. Rep. if 19,425 (FTC 1970).
152 See R. Nader, L. Dodge & R. Hotchkiss, What To Do With Your Bad Car; An
Action Manual for Lemon Owners 107-32 (Grossman 1970).
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Pursuant to its regulation-making authority,'" the FTC should
seriously consider promulgating specific standards of disclosure ap-
plicable to all franchisors in their dealings with prospective fran-
chisees.'" These standards of disclosure should be modeled on the
detailed prospectus disclosures prescribed by a recently enacted Cali-
fornia statute" and proposed in federal,"° New York"' and Massa-
chusetts1" legislation. For example, under the disclosure provisions
of the new California law, after fully identifying itself, the franchisor
must disclose to prospective franchisees such matters as outstanding
convictions, judgments, or administrative or court orders relating to
its business activities; 189
 its financial and franchising history;'" its
franchise agreement; 181
 its franchise fees and their computation; 182
other required payments or fees, including those payable to third
party vendors; 1 " conditions involving termination, refusal to renew,
or the franchisor's option to repurchase a franchise; 104 any supplies,
equipment or other goods which the franchisee is required to purchase
from the franchisor or third parties; 1" limitations on products or
territories; 168 financial dealings, including discounting of paper;"'
153 See 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964),
154
 See the remarks of L.G. Meyer, Director of Policy Planning of the Federal
Trade Commission at the annual meeting of the International Franchise Association in
Miami, Florida, on January 21, 1971, suggesting the promulgation of FTC regulations
concerning required disclosures to prospectve franchisees instead of statutory disclosure
requirements akin to those in the securities acts. Trade Regulation Reports, no. 502,
Jan. 25, 1971, at 5-6.
155
 Laws 1970, ch. 1400 (7 CaI. Leg. Serv. 2733 (West 1970)) (amending
	 10177
of the Business and Professions Code, amending 11 25019 and 25212 of the Corporations
Code and adding to Title 4 of the Corporations Code a new Division 5, consisting of
11 31000-516).
15° S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (sponsored by Senator Williams of New
Jersey). The bill would vest enforcement power in the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Although the measure did not receive consideration during the past session, its
reintroduction is expected.
157
 Senate Bill 8403B and Assembly Bill 5767B (Feb. 17, 1970), both of which failed
to pass. The Committee on Licensing Franchising has held three hearings in 1970 with a
view toward submitting new proposals in the 1971 session.
158
 Senate Bill 110 has been submitted to the 1971 session on behalf of the author
under the cosponsorship of Senator Mario Umana, the Senate Majority Leader.
159 CaI. Corp. Code §§ 31111(e) (1)-(4) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2740 (West 1970)).
100 Cal. Corp. Code §§ 31111(f)-(g), (r) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2740-41 (West 1970)).
101 Cal. Corp. Code § 31111(h) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2740 (West 1970)).
101 Cal. Corp. Code § 31111(i) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2740 (West 1970)).
1 °3 Cal. Corp. Code § 31111(j) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
1 °4 Cal. Corp. Code 31111(k) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
105 Cal. Corp. Code 3111I(1) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
100 Cal. Corp. Code 11 31111(m), (s) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
1°I Cal. Corp. Code	 31111(n)-(o) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
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projected financial earnings and the data used;'" and the exact
connection of any public figure endorsing the franchise."'
The principle underlying such required disclosures is the recogni-
tion that franchisors will be encouraged to maintain higher standards
if their activities are subject to public scrutiny. As the progenitor
of the disclosure provisions of the securities acts, the late Justice
Brandeis aptly observed: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial disease. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants."'"
3. The Federal "Dealers' Day in Court Act"
In response to the pressure exerted by the demise of thousands
of auto dealerships after World War II , Congress responded with the
so-called "Dealers' Day in Court Act," 17' a measure requiring the
manufacturer "to act in good faith in performing or complying with
any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating,
canceling, or not renewing the franchise." 172 The notable failure of
the dealers to obtain any meaningful relief under that statute" was
predictable in view of the Act's restrictive definition of "good faith"
solely in terms of coercion, intimidation or the threat of either, and its
express condonation of "recommendation, endorsement, exposition,
persuasion, urging or argument."'" Although recent decisions have
attempted to engraft some flesh upon this statutory skeleton,'" the
Act stands as a monument to the false hopes of the auto dealers, and
168 Cal. Corp. Code § 31111(p) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
155 Cal. Corp. Code § 31111(q) (7 Cal. Leg. Serv. 2741 (West 1970)).
170 L. Brandeis, Other People's Money, and How the Bankers Use It 92 (1914).
171 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-225 (1964).
172 15 U.S.C. # 1222 (1964).
173 From 1956 until 1965 not one dealer obtained and held a judgment under that
Act. By 1967, an expert witness testifying before a congressional committee could cite
only four cases in which a dealer had been successful. See remarks of Attorney John J.
Curtin, Jr., in The Realities of Franchising, A Guide for the Practicing Attorney 118-19
(Mass. Continuing Legal Education, Inc. ed., Faneull Press 1970) [hereinafter cited as
The Realities of Franchising].
174 15	 § 1221(e) (1964). See H. Brown, Franchising: Trap for the Trusting
79-82 (2d printing 1970).
176 See, e.g., Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966) (paying lip service to "coercion," but reasoning
almost entirely in terms of "good faith"); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, 384
F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967) ; Swartz v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 297 F. Supp. 834 (D. N.J.
1969); Curtin, The Automobile Dealers' Act, The Hart Bill, printed in The Realities of
Franchising, supra note 173, at 117-24. But see such earlier cases as Milos v. Ford Motor
Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir. 1963) (holding that the dealer must show actual coercion
or intimidation to obtain relief under the "Dealers' Day in Court Act") ; Leach v. Ford
Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (holding that, in order to recover under
the Act, a dealer must show both "bad faith and coercion").
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as proof of the folly of attempting to create a workable definition of
"good faith."
Since "bad faith" under the Dealers' Day in Court Act actually
requires a showing of coercion, intimidation or the threat of either,'"
it has been virtually impossible for dealers to obtain relief from
oppressive manufacturer practices either during or at the termination
of a dealership. However, there is a substantial body of law establish-
ing the impropriety of a termination or failure to renew when it is in
furtherance of an antitrust violation. 177 Good faith in the performance
of contracts is required by the common law, and a bad faith termina-
tion would give rise to a separate contract cause of action, even in a
federal Dealers' Day in Court Act suit, with federal jurisdiction over
this state common law claim conferred by the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Despite the availability of these various theories of
recovery, most dealers have sought relief solely under the Dealers'
Day in Court Act, with its many substantive deficiencies.
In addition to its substantive inadequacies, the Dealers' Day in
Court Act embodies a number of procedural shortcomings. The Act
provides only single, rather than treble, damages and, since the usual
dealer claim under the Act is by nature an individual rather than a
collective injury, such claims do not generally qualify to be brought
as class actions."' Dealers are thus denied not only the promise of
adequate recovery and its concomitant inducement to counsel, but
are also deprived of the deterrent effect which the prospect of such
class suits would have upon the manufacturers. In the final analysis,
the popular name of the statute, the "Dealers' Day in Court Act,"
embodies all that the Act affords by way of relief—merely a day in
court. Practically speaking, litigation under the Act is an exercise in
frustration, and the experience only serves to confirm the principle
that ill-conceived legislation can be worse than no legislation at all.
C. The "Baby" FTC Act
The state of Massachusetts has recently enacted a so-called
"Baby" FTC Act,"° embodying the same basic prohibition as the
federal statute,18° and expressly adopting the applicable rulings of the
170 Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir. 1963); Leach v. Ford Motor
Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
177 Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. § 73,399 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Wade, Some Antitrust Problems in Terminating
Franchises, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 23, 24 n.4 (1969).
178 See the requirements set forth in F.R. Civ. P. 23.
178 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1970).
lso Compare Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (Supp. 1970) with 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1964).
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FTC and the federal courts as precedent in Massachusetts.'" Just
as the federal statute is administered solely by the FTC with no pri-
vate right of action, the administration and enforcement of the Massa-
chusetts version was originally confined to the Attorney General
through rule-making power and suits to compel compliance.'" In 1969,
however, the remedial provisions of the Act were broadened to afford
a direct right of enforcement to consumers, including the possibilities
of injunctive relief, class actions, double damages (including rea-
sonable attorney fees), and even treble damages in aggravated cases.'"
It is against the preceding factual, economic, common law and
statutory background that the new Massachusetts Auto Dealers' Act
must be evaluated. In essence, the new statute has codified a number
of principles which, in time, may well have emerged through contin-
uing judicial interpretation of existing statutes, through an enlightened
concept of "good faith," and particularly through expanded applica-
tion of the proscriptions of Section 5 of the F.T.C.A.'" and its Massa-
chusetts counterpart, 18" against "unfair methods of competition" and
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices." The new Massachusetts Act,
however, has legislatively accelerated this evolutionary process and
has specifically proscribed many of the abusive practices of which
auto dealers have complained for decades. It is, as shall be demon-
strated, a true "Bill of Rights" for auto dealers.
III. THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS ACT
In its general pattern, the statute's° is basically an extension of
the "Baby" FTC Act,'" with further specification of practices which
constitute "unfair methods of competition." Following its preliminary
sections containing definitionsiss and "long-arm" jurisdiction over
non-domiciliaries,i8" the Act restates the prohibitions of, the
F.T.C.A.,'" and the power of courts to rely on the interpretations of
the federal statute,' and grants to the Attorney General rule-making
181 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (Supp. 1970).
182 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 2(c), 4-8 (Supp. 1970).
183 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 9-10 (Supp. 1970).
159 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
185 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (Supp. 1970).
186 Acts 1970, ch. 814, to be codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, §§ 1-14,
effective Jan. 1, 1971.
187 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1970).
188 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 1 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 712-13 (West 1970)).
188 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 2 (4 Mass. Leg. Eery. 713 (West 1970)). Sec
also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 223A, §§ 1-14 (Supp. 1971) for the general "long-arm"
provisions in Massachusetts.
too Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 3(a) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970))1
which essentially reflects the wording of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
101 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 3(b) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
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power consistent with FTC and federal court interpretations of the
F.T.C.A.'92
 It is thus important for counsel to become familiar with
the gamut of activity under the F.T.C.A., including cease and desist
orders, relevant court rulings, and the regulations and advisory
opinions issued by the FTC.
It should be noted that the Massachusetts Act's incorporation
by reference of all of the antitrust decisions under the federal acts, is
not limited to decisions affecting the automobile industry. Fortunately,
however, most appellate decisions in the federal trade regulation area
recapitulate prior decisions in considerable detail so that a review of
the more recent Supreme Court decisions in the various categories
will go far toward coverage of the field. Although the F.T.C.A. does
not provide a forum for private litigants in adversary proceedings, the
"Baby" FTC Act of Massachusetts has recently been amended so
as to grant such rights to consumers.'" Similarly, the new Massa-
chusetts Auto Dealers' Act confers the identical rights upon motor
vehicle dealers.'" Both of these classes of private litigants have thus
been accorded broader private rights than are presently available
under the federal acts.'"
A. Innovations in the Massachusetts Act
The real innovations of the Massachusetts Auto Dealers' Act are
contained in Section 4, 1" which embodies a number of specific prohibi-
tions, as described in the following subsections.
192 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, 13(c) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
193 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9-10 (Supp. 1970).
194 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 935, § 12 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)),
specifically incorporating by reference the damages provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 93A, I§ 9-10 (Supp. 1970).
199 In the only such decision to date, the First Circuit has permitted the use of a
final FTC cease and desist order as evidence of violation in a private damage suit. Farm-
ington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., Inc., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970). Previous
cases have held that unless the FTC specifically bases its order upon a finding that the
respondent had violated the antitrust laws the order will not be admissible as evidence
of a violation. See Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 308 F. Supp. 1401 (ED.
Pa. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 940 (1970) (holding that the final FTC orders upheld
by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied,
382 U.S. 873 (1965), enjoining Atlantic from further use of its "sales commission plan"
in the sale of tires, batteries and accessories (TEA) to dealers, were not per se deter-
minative of the issues in a private treble damages suit and could not be relied upon
by a private plaintiff seeking summary judgment on the strength of those FTC orders).
Recently proposed federal legislation would grant consumers the right to initiate class
actions against manufacturers to redress claims based upon deceptive practices or un-
satisfactory goods or services. The preconditions which would have to be met before
such suits could be brought, however, will be quite stringent. See S. 3074 and H.R.
18056, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
199 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713-16 (West 1970)).
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1. Prohibited Conduct on the Part of Manufacturers or Dealers
Subsection 1 prohibits a manufacturer or an auto dealer from
engaging "in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscio-
nable and which causes damage to any of said parties or to the
public.'"" In simple and unmistakable language, the statute thus
specifies that in all their dealings, including the inception, cancellation,
termination or renewal of a dealership, the parties must act in good
faith. Although the common law may not have required compassion
in the enforcement or authorized termination of ordinary contracts,'"
it has long been established that higher standards of conscionability
are required of fiduciaries, and that "the circumstances which may
create a fiduciary relationship are so varied and so difficult to foresee
that it is unwise for courts to attempt to make comprehensive defini-
tions."'" There is also an incipient trend to recognize that
every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between
the parties. In every contract, there is an implied covenant
that neither party will do anything having the effect of
destroying or injuring the rights of the other party to receive
the fruits of the contract.'"
Such principles have been used to prohibit the termination of a fran-
chise before the franchisee has had a reasonable opportunity to recoup
his investment with a reasonable profit.'" Now, through the new
Massachusetts Act, the arguments which have been raised in support
of recognizing fiduciary duties in the franchising relationship "2 stand
1 °7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(1) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
100 Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930); See Division of
the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969)
(recognizing a requirement of "good faith" only in the performance of a contract); 9
Williston on Contracts § 1017A at 153-57 (3rd ed. 1967); cf. 5A Corbin on Contracts
1229 (1964). See generally Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code—
Mixing Classified and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. Law. 1075 (1967).
19° Cann. v. Barry, 293 Mass. .313, 316, 199 N.E. 905, 906 (1936).
200 Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(involving a construction contract). See 11 Williston on Contracts § 1295, at 38-42
(3rd ed. 1968).
201 Gibbs v. Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1960); Beebe v. Columbia
Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 117 S.W.2d 624 (1938).
202 See Brown, supra note 174, at 41-44, suggesting that because of the franchisor's
pervasive power of control in complex transactions all franchising relations are fiduciary
in character; Brown, Franchising: A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Texas L. Rev. — (1971);
cf. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (imposing fiduciary respon-
sibilities on a joint venturer); Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556
(1965) (fiduciary duties arising out of a confidential business relationship); RLM
Associates, Inc. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., — Mass. —, 248 N.E.2d 646 (1969) (duty to act in
good faith in terminating commission agent's services) ; Jima, Ltd. v. Mister Donut of
Canada, Ltd. 3 Ont. 629 (1970) (presently under appeal), finding fiduciary obligations
in the franchising relationship.
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endorsed by legislative action, a precedent which should provide a
cogent basis for recognition of fiduciary duties in all other forms of
franchising as well.203
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Massachusetts Act is
the intentional absence of any definition of the terms "arbitrary,"
"bad faith" or "unconscionable," as they appear in its provisions, thus
affording broad discretion to the courts in interpreting and applying
these terms. This feature of the Act contrasts sharply with the de-
bilitating definition of "good faith" prescribed in the federal Dealers'
Day in Court Act 204 under which, absent some coercion or intimida-
tion, the courts have indicated that even an arbitrary non-renewal of
a dealership will not give a dealer a right of action 2 05
Even under the new Massachusetts Act it will still be necessary
to familiarize the court as thoroughly as possible with the full ramifi-
cations of franchising in presenting one's case. However, the Massa-
chusetts courts are now authorized to invoke the full powers of
equity, including mandatory and injunctive orders, rescission, modifi-
cation, restitution, reformation and damages in affording relief to auto
dealers. The availability of these fundamentally important modes of
relief is a considerable improvement over the federal Dealers' Day in
Court Act. In a recent case under that Act, even preliminary injunctive
relief against termination of a dealership was denied in accordance
with the court's view that, as a matter of law, a permanent injunction
would not be granted in the absence of a controversy involving land or
unique personalty.'"
On the other hand, the dealer must recognize that the same stan-
dards as are applicable to the manufacturer in its dealings with him
203 For a discussion of the application of a statutory standard as a common law
precedent see Tedla v. Ellman, 28 N.Y. 124, 129, 19 N.E.2d 987, 990 (1939); Note,
Statutory Violation as Negligence Dependent on Type of Statute Involved, 34 III. L.
Rev. 229 (1939); Note, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 143 (1939); Note, 18 Texas L. Rev. 102
(1939).
204 15 U.S.C.	 1221(e) (1964).
200 See R.A.C. Motors, Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., — F. Supp. —, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. if 73,402 (D. N.J. 1970). But see the sources cited in note 177 supra,
concerning the established antitrust doctrine proscribing a termination in aid of another
antitrust violation.
200 Miller Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 286 F. Supp. 529 (D.
Mass. 1968). But see Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1206-207
& n.14 (2d Cir. 1970); Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir. 1962) (grant-
ing a preliminary injunction to preserve the court's jurisdiction and the efficacy of the
plaintiff's remedies under the Dealers' Day in Court Act); Madsen v. Chrysler Corp.,
261 F. Supp. 488, 507 (N.D. Ill. 1966), vacated as moot, 375 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1967)
(granting a permanent injunction where manufacturer's "Minimum Sales Responsibility"
(MSR) quota was found to be arbitrary, unfair and coercive, and the mere awarding of
money damages would not adequately compensate the plaintiff, since it was impossible
to calculate such damages with reasonable accuracy).
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will govern his own obligations to the manufacturer. A balancing of
these reciprocal responsibilities would be required in such cases as '
Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 2*7 a recent case involving an
attempted termination of a dealership on the grounds that the dealer
allegedly submitted false warranty reimbursement claims and had
failed to comply with his assigned "Minimum Sales Responsibility"
(MSR) quota. The dealer, however, counterclaimed alleging that the
termination was retaliatory because of the dealer's activities in the
Ford Dealers Alliance, and further alleging that Ford had illegally
sought to question the dealer's customers. In a lengthy and careful
examination of the multifarious aspects of franchising in the auto
industry, the court recognized that "the balance of hardships tips
decidedly toward [the] plaintiff,"'" where his entire business may be
lost through the termination. Thus, the court affirmed the granting of a
temporary injunction without requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a
likelihood of success."° Based upon the gross disparity between the
relative bargaining power of the parties and the need for strict inter-
pretation of the franchise agreement against the draftsman, the court
thus recognized that the doctrinaire principle of sanctity of contract
would be subordinate to a termination "impermissibly motivated."'"
Transcending such concepts as "sanctity of contract" and "caveat
emptor," the standard of "good faith" may embody the implicit recog-
nition that franchising gives rise to a relationship comparable to that of
joint venturers, partners or master and servant. Like these other
relationships, franchising has its inception in a contract but may be
subject to equitable supervision. Given the traditional reluctance of
the courts to enunciate fixed definitions of "good faith" or "fraud" lest
the ingenuity of man devise facile means of circumventing the defini-
tions, the good faith standard should retain its inherent flexibility to
serve as a test for future practices. Although other more specific
statutory standards may be enacted, good faith should always remain
as the fundamental guide. Indeed, if franchising legislation were
allowed to contain but a single requirement, good faith on the part of
all parties in all dealings should suffice. However, imparting content
to a generic standard of good faith by stare decisis through years of
litigation would be both time consuming and inexpedient. Thus, a
207 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
2" Id. at 1205.
200 As the court aptly commented:
But the right to continue a business in which [the dealers] had engaged for
twenty years . . . is not measurable entirely in monetary terms; [the dealers]
want to sell automobiles, not to live on the income from a damages award....
Moreover, they want to continue living.
Id.
210 Id. at 1207.
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truly effective legislative approach should embody specific proscrip-
tions against the abuses most prevalent in franchising. This the
Massachusetts Act has done.
2. Prohibition Against Coercive Practices
Section 4(2) of the Massachusetts Act211 prohibits a manufac-
turer from using coercion or attempted coercion to induce a dealer to
order unwanted vehicles, parts or accessories, 212 or any special features
not included in the publicly advertised list price of the vehicle.213 This
provision responds directly to the dealers' complaints that they are
often required to purchase particular models, with certain optional
equipment, accessories or color combinations. Thus, rather than being
allowed independence of judgment in choosing marketable merchandise
for their particular clientele or geographical area, dealers are often
subjected to the manufacturers' concepts of marketability.
Although the proscribed use of "coercion or attempted coercion"
reflects a portion of the definition of "good faith" in the federal
Dealers' Day in Court Act,'" it should be noted that the Massachu-
setts Act contains no comparable exception for "recommendation,
endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument," as specified
in the federal statute 2 16 Further, the situation of the auto dealers
is quite similar to that of the gasoline station dealers in FTC v.
Texaco, Inc.,218 where the Supreme Court found "inherent coercion"
in the economic dominance exercised by the major oil companies over
their dealer franchisees. There the Court particularly noted the fact
that, despite the absence of any overt coercion, the dealers fully
understood what was expected of them, and the intimidating effect of
this knowledge was further buttressed by the implicit threat of non-
renewal of their dealerships.'" This sort of silent coercion can be even
more effective in the automobile business where dealers are exceedingly
vulnerable to delays in the shipment of their orders, endless reprocess-
ing of warranty claims, and many other such pressures which would
not warrant litigation, but which can be most disruptive to the dealer's
business.
In the antitrust field, these matters involve such issues as "full-
line forcing," under which a buyer is required to purchase a whole line
211 Mass, Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 938, § 4(2) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
212 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(2)(a)(c) (4 Mass. Leg, Serv. 713 (West
1970)).
218 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(2) (b) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
214 15 U.S.C. I 1221(e) (1964).
218 15 U.S.C.	 1221(e) (1964).
210 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
217 Id. at 229.
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of the seller's offering rather than specific merchandise,' and the
closely related complaints of "tying sales"'" and "exclusive supply"
contracts. 22° In "tying sales," the availability of one product, the tying
element, is made conditional on the purchase of another product, the
tied element. In "exclusive supply" contracts, the seller conditions the
making of a sale or the fixing of a price or rebate, upon the buyer's
agreement not to use or deal in the wares of a competitor. In the full-
line forcing situation, when the dealer is forced to purchase unwanted
merchandise, he is left with little choice but to employ strong sales
tactics to dispose of such wares to the consumer.
3. The Dealers' "Bill of Rights" Provision
Section 4(3) of the new Massachusetts Act embodies a true
"Bill of Rights" governing the dealers' relationship with the auto
manufacturers. In fourteen separate provisions, specific practices are
designated as being violative of the Act's general prohibition against
"unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices."' It will be seen that while each of these basic rights is addressed
to one of the specific abuses described earlier, a new principle has been
acknowledged, namely that a franchise is a status, not merely a con-
tractual relationship. In the past, franchisors have contended that a
franchise is merely a license to use a trademark, conditioned on the
subjective quality control required by the Lanham Act to avoid the
loss of the mark 122 That statute, however, expressly condemns any
use of a trademark to violate the antitrust laws."' On behalf of
franchisees, it has been vigorously contended that the relationship is
a license coupled with an interest, creating a status."' Any statutory
prohibition against termination or failure to renew the franchise im-
plicitly recognizes such a status. Such a relationship is thus made akin
to a marriage, contractual in its inception, but otherwise subject to
tenure on the ground of public policy.
Perhaps the seminal decision classifying an automobile dealership
218 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (proscribing "block booking"
of films).
219 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (currently being appealed).
220 Specifically prohibited under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1964). See Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143
.(D. Md. 1969) ; L. G. Balfour Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
18,485, at 20,846 (FTC 1968) (indicating that "exclusive supply" does not require a
legally binding contract).
221 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 3(a) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
222 See 15 U.S.C. §i 1055, 1064(e), 1127 (1964).
228 15 U.S.C.	 1115(b)(7) (1964). See Developments in the Law—Trade-marks
and Unfair Competition, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 816-19, 895-906 (1955).
224 Brown, Franchising: A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Texas L. Rev. — (1971).
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as merely a contractual relationship was Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer
Motor Co.225
 On the strength of that case, it was subsequently held
that under the antitrust laws a dealer, once appointed, has no tenure
or right to renewal of his contract.'" That sterile view can be traced
to the recent appellate holding that even a combination by a franchisor
and a new distributor to take away a distributorship is not necessarily
prohibited.227 More recently, however, the same court discerned a clear
anti-competitive effect where the franchisor terminated a distributor-
ship in order to substitute itself as the distributor.'" The court saw the
elimination of the independent distributor as constituting a possible
restraint of trade and as evidence of intent on the part of a dominant
manufacturer to monopolize. These two cases, however, represent a
difference without a distinction, and appear to reflect a complete lack
of appreciation for the economic consequences of a dealer's termina-
tion. Such a lack of basic understanding derives perhaps from the fact
that there is available little valid statistical information 2" and almost
no economic literature relating to franchising. 2"
225 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933).
225 Schwing Motor Co., Inc. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.
1956).
227 Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
228 Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. a 73,399 (9th Cir. 1970), relying in part upon Po ller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962), which reversed a summary judgment of dismissal
where' the plaintiff alleged that CBS had cancelled its affiliation with one UHF station
in Milwaukee following CBS acquisition of a competing station. See generally Fulda,
Single Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint ?,
30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 590 (1965), also cited by the court in Industrial Bldg. Mate-
rials, supra.
2211 See S. Rep. No. 91-1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1970), entitled "The
Impact of Franchising on Small Business," decrying the lack of valid statistical informa-
tion. Reports are expected early in 1971 on the FTC's in-depth study of fifty fast-food
and service franchises and on the Small Business Administration—funded study by the
University of Wisconsin. The few available studies are often quite unreliable. See, e.g.,
J. Atkinson, Franchising: The Odds-On Favorite (International Franchise Association
1968), reprinted in Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before
the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm.
on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-110 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Fran-
chising Hearings]. This study eliminates consideration of auto dealers, because their usual
investment is $100,000 or more, and excludes gasoline retailers, because they are con-
sidered to be "lessees." Furthermore, the unidentified study group upon which these
statistics were based was comprised of highly selected members of the International
Franchise Association, the basis of selection being the "completeness" of their reports,
thus ignoring the likelihood that only those boasting impressive records would report.
Finally, the "failure" statistics included in this study excluded "buy-backs" by the fran-
chisor even though the franchisee may have received much less than his total investment
in the "buy-back" transaction. See Senate Franchising Hearings, supra, at 3-4, 49-52
(including Mr. Atkinson's • reactions to these same contentions when presented by the
author to the Senate Subcommittee).
230 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1963), in which
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Conceptually, it is difficult to reconcile the remedial intent under-
lying the Dealers' Day in Court Act, which was enacted as a supple-
ment to the antitrust laws, with any interpretation of the Act which
affords relief to a dealer only if the manufacturer employs overt co-
ercion, intimidation or the threat of either. By focusing on the overt
nature of the conduct in question, such an interpretation implies that
only tortious conduct can be anti-competitive, whereas the actual eco-
nomic abuse emanates from the fact that the manufacturers exercise
virtually complete control over their dealers as a result of their awe-
some power to terminate or fail to renew a franchise."' In recognition
of the economic realities of the manufacturer-auto dealer relationship,
and particularly in recognition of the inherently coercive power which
is constantly available to the auto manufacturers, Section 4(3) of the
new Massachusetts Act232 specifically prohibits the following conduct
on the part of manufacturers:
a. Refusal to deliver a vehicle within a reasonable time
(thus preventing the manufacturers from rewarding
favored dealers by unreasonable preference in the supply
of desirable merchandise, and thereby eliminating a
subtle weapon for "disciplining" recalcitrant dealers) ; 223
b. Coercion or attempted coercion to enter into an agree-
ment or to do any act prejudicial to a dealer by threaten-
ing to cancel a franchise (thus eliminating another
weapon often used to control franchisees) ; 234
c. Termination or failure to renew a franchise without due
cause, with the proviso that notice of an allegedly justi-
fied termination must be given to the Attorney General
at least 60 days prior to the termination date, specifying
the ground for such , action, and with the further proviso
that in appropriate circumstances, a court may modify
the 60-day stay or extend it pending a final determina-
tion on the merits; 235
the Supreme Court indicated that it jacked sufficient economic data to uphold a summary
judgment in a price-fixing case.
231 The in terrorem effect of such complete control was fully recognized by the
Supreme Court in FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (involving the relationship
between gasoline station franchisees and the major oil companies).
232 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, §§ 4(3)(a)-(m) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713-16
(West 1970)).
288 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(a) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713-14 (West
1970)).
284 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3) (b) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 714 (West 1970)).
Compare 15 U.S.C. 1$ 1221(e) and 1222 (1964) with this provision of the Massachusetts
Act.
235 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 93B, § 4(3)(c) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 714 (West 1970)).
Query whether the self-help termination procedures often invoked by franchisors may
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d. Utilization of any false or misleading advertising (thus
giving the dealer a direct right to attack manufacturer
advertising which is deceptive to consumers, such as
misleading price comparisons or grossly exaggerated
sticker prices intended to mislead the consumer into
thinking that he is getting a bargain) j 236
e. Selling, or offering to sell, a new vehicle to a dealer at a
price below that offered to all dealers, including such
indirect devices as equipment allowances or disguising
such practices as "sales promotion" plans or programs,
but this prohibition of price discrimination between
dealers does not apply to sales for resale to federal or
state agencies or for ultimate use in driver education
programs; 2"
f. Selling or leasing, or offering to sell or lease, a vehicle
similarly equipped, at a lower actual price than that
charged to a dealer, or the use of any device to accom-
plish such price discrimination (thus prohibiting sub-
sidies to leasing and fleet buyers in any form, including
exaggerated advertising contributions) ; 233
g. Selling, or offering to sell, parts or accessories at a lesser
be a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding that garnishment of wages without a prior
hearing constitutes a denial of due process). In Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954
(S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 91 S. Ct. 893 (1971), the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a typical state replevin law allowing forcible entry and taking, based solely on
creditor's statement of nonpayment, and notwithstanding the debtor's claim of a meritori-
ous defense. The case may also involve a possible issue of validity of contractual waiver of
constitutional rights where there is gross imbalance between the bargaining positions of
the contracting parties. Contra, Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716
(N.D. N.Y. 1970) (holding New York's replevin provisions unconstitutional). See
generally Comment, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment: Notice and Hearing Requirements
Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 462 (1970);
Comment, Expanding Limitations on Prejudgment Attachment: Reverberations of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 700 (1971).
Given the gross imbalance between the franchisor and the typical franchisee when
the franchise agreement is being signed, the validity of contractual provisions reserving
to the franchisor the unilateral right to declare the franchisee to be in default may be
open to serious question. If the franchisee's premises are leased from the franchisor or
if his lease is collaterally assigned to the franchisor, eviction would require the usual
court process, although a temporary injunction against such eviction would not be
available if only violations of federal law are alleged. See Helfenbein v. International
Indus., Inc., — F.2d —, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. § 73,440, rehearing denied, — F.2d —, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. If 73,498 (8th Cir. 1971).
230 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(d) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 714 (West 1970)).
237 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, I 4(3) (e) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 714 (West 1970)).
See also the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act on price discrimination in the sale
of commodities to competing buyers. 15 U.S.C. 4 13(a) (1964); FTC v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
288 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, I 4(3)(f) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
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actual price than that charged to a dealer, except for
sales to a genuine wholesaler for resale to retail out-
lets; 289
h. Interfering with the dealer's capital structure or financ-
ing, subject to reasonable standards agreed to by the
parties and exclusive of any change in the executive
management control of the dealership (thus authorizing
dealers to utilize any form of equity or debt financing of
their businesses, including the unlimited sale of non-
voting stock, so long as 51 percent of the voting power is
retained by the dealers) ; 240
i. Interfering with .the sale or transfer of any part of an
interest in a dealership, provided that the manufac-
turer's consent must be obtained before a controlling
interest in a dealership is transferred and such consent
may not be "unreasonably withheld" (thus recognizing
the dealer's equity in his business as his independent
asset, alienable at market value, while simultaneously
preserving reasonable prerogatives for the manufac-
turers); 241
j. Obtaining any "kick-back" from suppliers with whom
the dealer does business; 242
239
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(g) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
249 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, { 4(3)(h) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
It has been suggested that any unreasonable restraint on alienation of a franchise may
constitute a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 US.C. § 1 (1964),
under United States v. Arnold, Schwinn Sr Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See proposed con-
clusions of Rufus E. Wilson, head of the FTC Bureau of Restraint of Trade, in Report
of the FTC Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising, Trade Regulation Reports, no. 444
[Supplement), Dec. 15, 1969, at 47-48.
241 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(i) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
See note 235 supra. The reasonableness of this provision does not appear to warrant the
gratuitous insult by a District Manager to a group of dealers shortly after enactment of
the statute, "[n]ow you can give your dealership to your idiot son or sell it to the
Mafia." In fact, the provision will go far to halt nepotism in the form of forced intra-
family transfers to avoid forfeiture of the dealer's equity. See the proposed complaint
in Adolph Coors Co., FTC File No. 701-0032, Trade Regulation Reports, no. 503, Feb. 1,
1971, at 4, in which the proposed order details a cancellation procedure to be followed
by a brewery in terminating distributors, including 180-day written notice detailing the
reason for cancellation. The proposed order also grants the distributor the unlimiled
right to sell his dealership to a third party, subject only to the brewery's reasonable
approval of the transferee's qualifications.
242 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3) (j) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
Sec Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965)
(upholding FTC cease and desist order against "sales-commission plan" whereby oil
company received commissions on tires, batteries and accessories sold by third party
supplier to dealers of the oil company); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968)
(upholding FTC cease and desist order in similar circumstances even absent any "overt
coercion" to induce dealers to deal with the third party supplier).
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k. Competing with a dealer in the relevant market area,
except where an independent person has a bona fide
minority interest in, and a reasonable expectation of ac-
quiring full ownership of, the dealership; 243
1. Granting a competitive franchise in the relevant market
area, provided that a franchise may be granted to an
independent dealer or to a bona fide minority dealer, so
long as the manufacturer notifies existing dealers in the
area of its intent to grant a new franchise and so long
as any objections entered by existing dealers are sub-
mitted to final and binding arbitration; 244
 and
242 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 9313, § 4(3)(k) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
This provision will prohibit a franchisor from directly competing with its own franchisee,
although this prevalent practice would appear to be illegal under the antitrust laws any-
way. See United States v. New York Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949). The practice also violates the general principles of equity under which any
purchaser of a business is entitled to the full benefit of his bargain. Direct competition
by a franchisor at the same economic level as its franchisees is rife with potential for
economic abuse, particularly when combined with pervasive control over the activities
of the franchisees. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 223 (1968). Thus, the likelihood
of antitrust violations is high when the factory operates a "company store" and sub-
sidizes its operating retail losses by capital gifts, free use of executives and advertising
allowances. As one court has noted: "Predatory price-cutting in one locality, subsidized
by adventitious resources" could constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964)). See Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 453, 459 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3rd Cir. 1969); 15 U.S.C. I§ 1,
13 (1964), denying the "fair trade" exemption under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman
Acts in situations involving dual distribution of products.
For a variant of the problems in dual distribution systems, see Continental Fran-
chise Review, vol. 4, no. 4, Feb. 22, 1971, at 7, reporting on the complaint in Fulford's,
Inc. v. General Electric Co., settled January 8, 1971, which involved a claim that per-
mitting only certain franchised dealers to make sales to the building trade, constituted a
per se "customer restriction" violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1
(1964)) under the rationale of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
244 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(1) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 715 (West 1970)).
This provision would prohibit a franchisor from "swamping" a given territory with an
excessive number of franchises. When a franchisor sells a franchise, the buyer should be
given a reasonable opportunity to succeed in business, contingent of course upon his
successfully competing against independent third parties, but free from competition
provided directly or indirectly by his own franchisor. See discussion in note 243 supra.
In contrast with the judicial policy of strictly construing a former employee's express
covenant not to compete, equity will liberally imply such a covenant on the part of the
seller of a business to protect the buyer from the seller's competition. Tobin v. Cody, 343
Mass. 716, 180 N.E.2d 652 (1962). Under the antitrust laws, where the dealer is ade-
quately serving the relevant market area, it might be argued that the granting of a new
dealership should constitute a combination in restraint of trade by the factory and the
new dealer under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (resale price maintenance combination
between manufacturer and dealers directed against "discount" dealers); Braun v. Beren-
son, 432 F.2d 538, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. f 73,338 (5th Cir. 1970) (reversing dismissal of ac-
tion alleging combination between lessor shopping center owner and another tenant to re-
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m. Requiring the dealer to waive any of his rights under the
new Act.'
Prohibitions (k) and (1) warrant further comment, particularly
in view of two recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.'" Although the antitrust laws were primarily designed
to foster competition, rather than merely to protect individual busi-
nesses, it would seem readily apparent that the preservation of the
independence of numerous small businessmen is essential to the ad-
vancement of competition."' That independence can be sapped both by
direct competition from the franchisor, as well as through the granting
of an excessive number of independent dealerships in a prescribed
territory. The supposed right of a franchisor to combine with a new
appointee to destroy an existing dealership, recently recognized in
Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors,
Ltd.,24a may, at first blush, appear justifiable since the number of
"independent" dealers, and hence the quantum of competition, is not
thereby diminished. But what cannot be ignored is the fact that the
mere possession of such awesome power by the franchisor is sufficient
to debilitate the supposed independence of all its remaining franchisees.
Because of its monopolistic implications, the exercise of such power by
a franchisor is most destructive to competition when the franchisor
fuse to rent additional space to plaintiff tenant); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit and
Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952) (combination by lessor of produce
market and other produce dealers to exclude plaintiff dealer from leasing space in the
market). But see Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969) (agreement by manufacturer and new distributor to termi-
nate existing distributor held not a per se boycott; seemingly reversible under United
States v. General Motors Corp., supra, as a classic conspiracy to restrain trade, particu-
larly where the offending dealership is owned or controlled by the manufacturer.
215 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(3) (m) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West
1970)).
24e Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1969); Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336,
5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 73,399 (9th Cir. 1970).
247 See deValpine, Antitrust—The Unevaluated System, in A Primer on Unlawful
Restraints in Marketing and Distribution; Proceedings of the First Annual New England
Antitrust Conference 1, 4 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc. 1967). The decrease in
automobile dealerships from 49,000 at the end of World War II to a current number of
less than 27,000, indicates an annual average net loss of almost 1,000 dealerships. Among
gasoline station dealerships, such economic decimation is even worse, the best available
statistics showing an annual loss of from 25% to 40% of the nation's 225,000 gasoline
station dealerships, either through insolvency or failure to obtain a renewal. The dealer's
equity is inevitably forfeited in such circumstances. Given the fact that franchisees
account for $90 billion in annual sales, 10% of the Gross National Product, and over
25% of all retail sales, it is imperative to assure greater independence for these small
businessmen if meaningful competition is to be preserved.
248 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
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controls a dominating share of a particular market. However, the
impact of termination upon the franchisee is equally devastating
whether exercised by a dominant or a smaller franchisor. This devastat-
ing impact is further intensified by the fact that franchising agreements
customarily contain a covenant by the franchisee not to compete with
the franchisor in the event of any termination. Accordingly, even absent
any allegation or proof that a given franchisor has engaged in the
numerous anti-competitive practices at its disposal, the very fact
that franchisors possess such pervasive power should prompt consider-
ably more penetrating and circumspect scrutiny of franchisor conduct
than has previously been evident—particularly in the area of termina-
tion of dealerships.
4. Prohibitions Against Specific Dealer Conduct
As previously noted, in 1969, Massachusetts granted to all con-
sumers a direct cause of action for violations of the "Baby" FTC
Act,249 a remedy which, surprisingly, has been ignored. 25° Consonant
with the strong contemporary trend toward consumer protection, the
new Massachusetts Dealers' Act also includes specific prohibitions
against the following dealer practices toward consumers:
a. Requiring a purchaser to buy equipment or accessories
not desired or requested, unless such features were al-
ready installed when the car was received by the dealer
and the customer was so informed; tai
b. Representing as a new car any demonstrator or otherwise
used vehicle; 252 and
c. Using false or misleading advertising?"
249 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9-10 (Supp. 1970).
259 See Acts 1970, ch. 880 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 807 (West 1970)), amending the
Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106) by adding
after the present section 2-316, governing exclusion or modification of warranties, a new
section 2-316A, denying to any seller or manufacturer the right to limit implied war-
ranties to consumers and restricting the right to limit consumer remedies for breach of
express warranties. Even now the FTC and various state legislatures are investigating
abuses of express warranties which deny consumers the substantial benefit of their
bargain. See proposed federal Consumer Warranty Acts, H.R. 18056, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), discussed in Trade Regulation Reports, no. 486, Oct. 5, 1970, at 8; S. 3074, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ; H.R. 261, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ; proposed FTC trade
regulation rule covering new car pricing practices of manufacturers and dealers in support
of Automobile Information Disclosure Act, reported in Trade Regulation Reports, no.
488, Oct. 19, 1970, at 4.
251 Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, 4(4)(a) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
252 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4 (4) (b) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
253 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(4) (c) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
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B. Pre-delivery and Warranty Provisions
1. Pre-delivery Obligations
Under Section 5 of the new Massachusetts Act264 the manufac-
turer must specify the dealer's pre-delivery and preparation obliga-
tions, together with a compensation schedule detailing the amounts
which will be paid to the dealer for fulfillment of those obligations,
and copies of both must be filed with the Attorney General. The com-
pensation schedules must be reasonable, and the dealer's delivery and
preparation obligations constitute the limit of the dealer's product
liability as between himself and the manufacturer. Unless his obliga-
tions are so specified, the dealer would not be responsible for perform-
ing any pre-delivery and preparation work and, presumably, can refuse
to accept a vehicle needing such work. This provision should result in
clear definition of the dealer's obligations to finish the manufacturer's
work, and should assure full and fair compensation to the dealer for
any work performed.
2. Warranty Obligations
As to warranty work, Section 6 of the new Massachusetts Act"'
specifies that the manufacturer must properly fulfill its warranty
agreements, including adequate and fair compensation to the dealer for
labor and parts.2 ° Claims must be acted upon within thirty days,
254
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 935, § 5 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
255
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 6 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
256
 A similar provision in the Tennessee statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1714(h) (7)
(1968), requiring that the labor rate for warranty reimbursement be no less than that
charged to a retail customer is presently under constitutional attack by the Big Three
and International Harvester Co. See Ford Motor Co. v. Noles, Civil No. 5056 (M.D.
Tenn., filed April 29, 1968) ; General Motors Corp. v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Comm.,
Civil No. 5107 (M.D. Tenn., filed April 29, 1968) ; Chrysler Motors Corp. v. McCanless,
Civil No. 5065 (M.D. Tenn., filed May 10, 1968) ; International Harvester Co. v. Mc-
Canless, Civil No. 5078 (M.D. Tenn., filed April 18, 1968).
In view of such federal precedents as the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.
	 276a(a)
(1964) (prescribing "prevailing wages" for labor on government construction contracts),
the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1964) (requiring that specified local labor
rates be incorporated into government procurement contracts), and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1964) (prescribing minimum labor rates), it is difficult
to comprehend the basis for a constitutional attack on state legislation prescribing
"retail" labor rates for warranty work, particularly since states are not confronted with
the jurisdictional problems inherent in the federal statutes.
Under the "5-years-or-50,000-miles" warranty the labor rates problem was particu-
larly acute, due to the duration of the warranty. In the past two years, all of the
factories have gradually returned to the "1-year-or-12,000-mile" warranty, thus easing
the dealer's obligations considerably. Although this legislation is not a "labor" statute,
it should be obvious that when the dealer is reimbursed by the factory at "wholesale"
labor rates, he cannot be expected to pay his labor at "retail" labor rates. The Big Three
have publicly stated that if they lose the pending constitutional attack on the Tennessee
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with specification of grounds if rejected. Claims under this section and
under section 5 (for pre-delivery work), must be paid within thirty
days of approval. This section should eliminate most of the dealers'
complaints regarding inadequate compensation for warranty work and
endless delays in approval of reimbursement claims, and should result
in prompt cash payments to the dealers, thus relieving them of having
to look to the customer for payment. Perhaps more so than any other
provision, these requirements will be buttressed by the Act's general
prohibition against conduct which is arbitrary, in bad faith or un-
conscionable. 2"
3. Manufacturer Pre-delivery Practices Since Enactment of the
Massachusetts Act
On the effective date of the new Massachusetts Act, with its pro-
visions requiring specification of the dealers' delivery and preparation
obligations, the major auto manufacturers adopted procedures which
appeared to make a mockery of the legislation. After filing with the
Attorney General the required documentation specifying the dealers'
pre-delivery preparation obligations and the compensation schedules
specifying the amounts which would be paid by the manufacturers to
the dealers for this work, the manufacturers estimated the average
pre-delivery preparation cost per vehicle; for example, $50 for each
Thunderbird. That amount was then added to the dealer's invoice,
together with an additional charge of seven percent of the increase to
cover the federal excise tax. To illustrate, if the normal Thunderbird
invoice were $4,000, the new invoice bears an increase of $50 plus
$3.50 for the tax.
Once the dealer had completed his preparation and pre-delivery
operations, he was entitled to submit a claim to the manufacturer for
reimbursement in accordance with the compensation schedules on file
with the Attorney General. It was specified by most of the manufac-
turers, however, that no dealer was to file a claim for reimbursement
until completion of a retail sale by delivery to a customer. Finally,
even upon allowance of the reimbursement claim, there would only be
a credit to the dealer's "parts account," rather than a cash payment
directly to the dealer. The net result of all of this was that instead
of actually being compensated by the manufacturer for services per-
formed in connection with pre-delivery preparations, the dealer had to
surrender his own cash to the manufacturer, thereby losing the use
of it; pay an additional amount in federal excise tax; and then wait
statute, they will accede to an amendment to the Massachusetts statute prescribing "retail"
labor rates for warranty work.
2" Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, 4(1) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv, 713 (West 1970)).
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until delivery to the consumer before receiving a credit against his
own money. Furthermore, although the standard dealer franchise
agreement provides for the extension of thirty days' credit on the
dealer's parts account, the pre-delivery reimbursement was to be
credited to that account, thus diminishing the amount of credit actually
available to the dealer.
Although the manufacturer is not subject to price control on its
new car invoice charges to the dealer, it is nevertheless bound by the
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibiting any price discrim-
ination between competitors. 238 Since the hundreds of Massachusetts
dealers are in direct competition with the dealers in the six bordering
states, charging a Massachusetts dealer $4,053.50 for the identical
vehicle sold in an adjacent state for $4,000, would appear to be a clear
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Oddly enough, the very same
procedure has been condoned by dealers in the three other states which
have adopted similar statutory provisions, namely, Wisconsin, 2" Ten-
nessee2" and Mississippi."' In Massachusetts, however, the dealers
regarded this advance payment procedure as flouting the policy and
the very terms of the newly adopted statute and vigorously protested
the practice. Apparently acceding to the intense pressure exerted by
the auto dealers, General Motors has publicly announced that com-
mencing March 1, 1971, new car invoice charges will be evenly
increased on a national basis, and dealers will be reimbursed for the
cost of warranty work on each car, payable as the work is performed.202
Although it is not possible to legislate specifically against every
existing or potential opportunity for abuse in this area, the generic
proscriptions of the Massachusetts "Baby" FTC Act, 203
 as well as the
prohibition in the new Massachusetts Act against "any action which
is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable," 264
 should be sufficiently
flexible to encompass newly developing forms of abusive practices.
Thus, for auto dealers in particular, the Massachusetts statute stands
in clear contrast to the federal Dealers' Day in Court Act"' under
which relief has been frustratingly elusive. 2"
258 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
2 a 9
 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 218.01(3) (a)(22) (Supp. 1970).
260
 Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1714(h)(7) (1968).
261 Miss. Code Ann. § 8071.7-06(A)(9) (Supp. 1970).
262
 See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1970, at 5, col. 2.
268
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (Supp. 1970), reflected in the parallel
wording of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 3(a) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
264
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4(1) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 713 (West 1970)).
203 15 U.S.C. 11 1221-225 (1964).
266
 From 1956 to 1965, not one dealer was able to obtain a favorable final judgment
under that statute. See note 173 supra.
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C. Provisions Restricting Permissible Contract Terms and Practices
In addition to the substantive regulations just discussed, Sections
7 through 11 of the new Massachusetts Act 2 " place specific restric-
tions upon the terms which may be included in contracts between the
auto manufacturers and their dealers. Among these restrictions are the
following.
1. Prohibition Against Unreasonable Restrictions on Dealers
To counter-balance the gross disparity between the relative
bargaining positions of the auto manufacturers and their dealers,
Section 7 of the new Massachusetts Act 208 prohibits unreasonable re-
strictions on numerous general matters, including transfer or sale of a
dealership, right to renew, termination, "discipline" devices, covenants
not to compete, site control, and other sources of leverage which have
individually and collectively contributed to the dominance of the
manufacturers over their dealers. Illustrative of the unreasonable
restrictions sought to be proscribed by this provision would be pro-
hibitions against the dealer's selling a dealership to a willing buyer
at a price exceeding the value of the net tangible assets of the dealer-
ship. The provision would also prevent a manufacturer representative
from selecting a new dealer to replace an existing dealer. The specific
reference to "discipline" would appear to preclude the manufacturers
from punishing a dealer through any form of discrimination or ha-
rassment. Although it is not anticipated that minimal irritations will
give rise to litigation under the new Act, its statutory assurances will
undoubtedly enhance the dealers' willingness to assert their rights
where material abuses are encountered.
To confirm the full impact of these principles, Section 8 of the
Act2" expressly extends the Act's provisions to the whole range of
contracts between the manufacturer and its dealers, even including the
"franchise offering." 2" Given the statutory prohibition of "unfair or
207 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, §§ 7-11 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716-17 (West
1970)).
268 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 7 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
200 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 8 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716 (West 1970)).
270 This specific reference to the "franchise offering" expressly lays the foundation
for anti-fraud protection for prospective franchisees, similar to that presently afforded to
a purchaser of a security under the federal securities acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1
(1964), and particularly 15 U.S.C. § 785(b) (1964); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.
10b-5 (1970). A recently enacted California statute accords such protection specifically
to franchisees, as would proposed federal legislation. See notes 155 and 156 supra;
H. Brown, Franchising: Trap for the Trusting 70-76 (2d printing 1970) (regarding
the question of whether a franchise is an "investment contract" and therefore a
"security"); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement As a
Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. Law. 1311
(1969). This issue is now being widely litigated. See Mr. Steak, Inc v. River City
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deceptive practices" in Section 3(a) of the Act, and the broad defini-
tion of "fraud" in Section 1(m), as including misrepresentation,
"whether intentionally false or due to gross negligence, a promise or
representation not made honestly and in good faith, and an intentional
failure to disclose a material fact," the Act appears to impose require-
ments of fullest disclosure in connection with any "franchise offering."
There is considerable doubt that any of the factories have ever met
such standards with respect to disclosing to prospective dealers the
numerous practices of which existing dealers complain, whether
"operating," "capital," or "administrative" in nature.
2. Provision for Compensation to Dealers
Section 9 of the new Massachusetts Act27' provides that if "with-
out due cause" the manufacturer fails to renew, terminates or restricts
a transfer of a dealership, the dealer must "receive fair and reasonable
compensation for the value of the business." As simple as the justice
of this formula would appear, it will bring to an end the manufac-
turers' practice of ignoring the dealer's contribution to the goodwill of
the dealership, and their prior policy of prohibiting the dealer from
charging a purchaser for this asset in a sale of the dealership. Goodwill
is universally recognized as a valuable, though intangible, asset of
any going business. Significantly, this alternative to the dealer's right to
seek injunctive relief against termination of a dealership, was the
ultimate focus of the manufacturers' opposition to adoption of the
Massachusetts Act. Perhaps the unspoken reason for their adamant
opposition to this section is its implicit restraint on the market re-
structuring abuses discussed above. 272
3. Dealers' Right of "Free Association"
Section 10 of the Massachusetts Act 278 provides that le] very
franchisee shall have the right of free association with other franchisees
for any lawful purpose." Given the furor which preceded the adoption
of the National Labor Relations Act274 and its counterpart in Massa-
chusetts, the State Labor Relations Law,"' it may be open to question
Steak, Inc., — F. Supp. —, Civil No. C-1787 (D. Colo., decided Sept. 30, 1970) (holding
that a fast-food franchise is not a "security" under the federal securities acts) ; Aber-
crombie v. Lum's, Inc., — F'. Supp. —, Civil No. 295-70-A (E.D. Va., decided April 12,
1971) (holding that franchise agreements were not "investment contracts" subject to
the securities acts). Where the auto manufacturer sells the dealer securities representing
a fractional interest in an auto dealership, under some form of a dealer development
program, there would appear to be no doubt as to the applicability of SEC Rule 10b-5.
271 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 9 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 716-17 (West 1970)).
272 See discussion on pp. 768-69 supra.
275 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 9311, § 10 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
274 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1964).
275 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 150A, H 1-12 (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1971). Many
other states have enacted similar statutes.
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whether the auto dealers have obtained a material right under this
provision, particularly since earlier drafts of the new Massachusetts
Act would have specifically accorded the dealers the full panorama of
collective bargaining rights contained in the State Labor Relations
Law, including the separate statute governing the use of arbitration as
a method of settling disputes."° In the absence of such a specific recog-
nition of collective bargaining rights, the limiting phrase in the new
Act, allowing dealers the right of free association "for any lawful pur-
pose,"2" appears to beg the question. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
a substantive achievement is embodied in the phrase "right of free as-
sociation with other franchisees," and that the necessity of giving mean-
ing to those words calls for limited construction of the restriction "for
any lawful purpose." Resort to the historical background of the statute
and a clear appreciation for the purposes underlying it should provide
some basis for its meaningful interpretation. In this connection it
should be noted that a fundamental inconsistency confronting all
franchisees is the fact that, while conceptually and theoretically they
are independent businessmen, in fact they are subject to so many
economic and legal burdens that their status is not substantially differ-
ent from that of employees. As aptly expressed by a Canadian court in
the recent case of Jima, Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd.: 278
It appears to me that the relationship between the fran-
chisor and the franchisee in the case at bar is much more
than a simple vendor-and-purchaser relationship. In some re-
spects it has at least some of the attributes of a partnership.
To the extent that the arrangement requires the franchisor to
purchase all supplies from persons of its own choosing, a prin-
cipal-and-agency relationship has been established. Certainly,
what has been created is a very close association, a venture
in common, or a joint venture. If that be so, then what may
be described as fiduciary obligations or at least quasi-fidu-
ciary obligations, have been created."D
The court further observed:
In this particular type of relationship, it appears to me
that franchisor and franchisee are bound together over a
very long period of years in a relationship which in many re-
270
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130C, § 1-16 (Supp. 1971). Full collective bargaining
rights would be accorded to all franchisees under Senate Bill 110, currently under con-
sideration by the Massachusetts Legislature. See note 138 supra.
277
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, i 10 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)). See
discussion in note 59 supra.
278 3 Ont. 629 (1970) (currently under appeal).
270 Id. at 637.
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spects is almost as close as that of master and servant. While
of course it is not the same, nevertheless the relationship is so
close that confidence is necessarily reposed by the one in
the other.'"
Similarly, in spite of the contractual terms of the franchise, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has held that some fran-
chisees are in fact "employees" within the statutory definition of the
Wagner Act."' In January, 1969, the Labor Court of Sweden held
that the gasoline station dealers of Esso were entitled to collective
bargaining rights in view of the dominant economic power of the oil
company and the control inherent in the fact that the dealers had to
look to the company as their sole source of supply. 282
On the technical side, to the extent that franchisees are regarded
as independent businessmen, collective activity can be perilous. For
example, when the International Teamsters Union tried to organize a
number of gasoline station dealers in California several years ago,
their activity was successfully attacked as a common law criminal
conspiracy,288 much as were the seminal attempts to organize labor
unions in the 1920's.284 In a recent case before the FTC, the National
Association of Women's and Children's Apparel Salesmen was charged
with being an illegal combination of independent businessmen under
the Clayton Act, the Association contended that it is a labor organiza-
tion, and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. The FTC,
however, admitted as part of the record of its proceedings, a recent
decision by the NLRB disqualifying the Association from acting as a
labor organization, despite the fact that the NLRB decision was sub-
ject to appeal.'" Nonetheless, out of "deference" to the NLRB's rul-
ing, the FTC found that the labor antitrust exemption was not avail-
able to the Association.'"
There is also the potential risk that even acting as independent
businessmen, a so-called "strike" by a group of franchisees would
280 Id. at 640-41.
281 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964). See, e.g., Mister Softee of Indiana, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B.
354, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966) ; News Syndicate Co., Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 422, 65
L.R.R.M. 1104 (1967) ; cf. The Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R.I3. No. 159, 67
1582 (1968).
282 As reported in Gasoline Retailer, vol. 68, no. 1, Jan. 7, 1970, at 3.
283 Since none of the convictions were appealed the cases are unreported.
2114 See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921); Hitchman Coal Sr Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1917).
285 National Ass'n of Women's and Children's Apparel Salesmen, Inc., [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. IT 19,016 (FTC 1969).
288 National Ass'n of Women's and'Children's Apparel Salesmen, Inc., 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. 19,538 (FTC 1971). For the NLRB's decision see Bambury Fashions, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. No. 75, 72 L.B lz.M. 1350 (1969).
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constitute a per se boycott violation under the antitrust laws 287
 In
the labor relations context, that very risk led to the need for exemption
of labor disputes from the impact of the antitrust laws. 2" But even
that exemption was held insufficient to shield the action of numerous
brokerage firms which jointly imposed uniform reductions in the com-
missions paid to their "employee-representatives."2" In this circum-
stance the statutory exemption was held to require either the existence
or the prospect of a joint collective bargaining agreement with a union.
Historically, auto dealer associations have been of several types,
with varying purposes and efficacy. At the national level, the National
Automobile Dealers Association draws its members from individual
dealers of all the manufacturers, having neither direct nor affiliative
connections with state and other groups. Although its membership is
substantial and it maintains a full-time staff, including legal counsel
to contest challenges to state legislation benefitting auto dealers, it has
been criticized as being too unwieldy to act in an expeditious and
effective manner. Within its limitations, however, it has afforded
considerable assistance to dealers, most recently in its successful
educational campaign to induce the Big Three to forego subsidies to
leasing and fleet buyers, and through its financial support of a pending
test case on this question against Chrysler.2" As previously noted,
Chrysler has claimed that this financial support is itself evidence of a
combination in restraint of trade on the part of the dealers of the
other manufacturers.
In most states, there are associations of the dealers of all the
manufacturers, some of the larger states having two such organiza-
tions. While it is impossible to evaluate the individual effectiveness of
so many entities, it is known that some have acted vigorously in
various areas, particularly in the legislative sphere, while others have
been little more than social clubs. In at least one instance, an associa-
tion has reverted to coordinating group insurance plans as its principal
activity, and has expressly terminated all lobbying efforts as a threat
to its non-profit corporate charter and its tax-exempt status.
More recently, there have arisen a number of so-called "line"
associations, confined to the dealers of a particular manufacturer and
usually active in a limited geographical area. As a result of strong
leadership, tight membership and common problems, arising from the
287 See Klor's, Inc, v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
288 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
2" Cordova v. Bache & Co., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 600, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. if 73,406
(S.D,N,Y. 1970). Interestingly, the court also held that although the employees' associa-
tion was not a proper party plaintiff, it would permit individual employees to be sub-
stituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 608, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. If 73,406, at 89,657.
200 See discussion at p. 775 and note 54 supra.
814
A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR AUTO DEALERS
fact that all members deal with the same manufacturer, these associa-
tions have been rather vocal in their demands for radical changes in
the factory-dealer relationship. The independence of such "line"
associations affords a marked contrast to the ineffectiveness of the
regional "Dealer Councils" created by the individual manufacturers
and consisting of dealers elected by other dealers. One possible reason
for the general ineffectiveness of such councils is their close identity
with the individual manufacturer. In addition, the long history of
procrastination, protracted studies, and ultimate inaction on the part
of the manufacturers in response to suggestions from the councils
offers little by way of hope for future improvement. Ford's recent
effort, discussed earlier, 29' to invigorate this program by providing
regionally selected dealer groups to review individual dealer com-
plaints, appears specious in the absence of any firm commitment on
the part of Ford to abide by the decisions of these panels.
Technicalities aside, it seems evident that genuine collective bar-
gaining by franchisees provides the only realistic hope for an effective
franchising relationship. Even those who doubt the need for such
collective bargaining would doubtless find that mechanism for the
resolution of dealer grievances preferable to the cataclysmic alterna-
tive of treble damage class antitrust suits, involving claims of $100
million or more. Interestingly enough, during the pendency of such
suits counsel for the dealers and the factory may engage in a form
of "collective bargaining" to settle the claims, subject to the provisions
of Federal Rule 23, requiring court approval of any settlement after
formal notice to all members of the class. To avoid the necessity of •
such "back-door" collective bargaining, the author has recommended
to the FTC that it promulgate regulations or propose legislation to
permit such bargaining without the disruption, expense and delay
inevitably entailed in antitrust litigation.
Permeating this entire issue is the gross imbalance between the
relative bargaining positions of the individual franchisees and the
franchisors, particularly where the franchisors are economic giants,
such as the auto manufacturers or the major oil firms. Although labor
groups may decry the comparison, the fact remains that the greater
the franchisee's investment of money and labor in his dealership, the
greater is his fear for the consequences of standing up for his rights.
In contrast, the non-unionized employee who is unhappy with his lot,
at least has the options of resigning or of joining in an effort to obtain
collective representation. Given both the impossibility of legislating
against every conceivable abuse in every franchising industry, and the
unsuitability of litigation as a means of resolving conflicts in a dy-
291 See discussion at pp. 773-74 supra.
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namic and continuing joint enterprise, the courts should not prove
insensitive to the compelling social need for permitting collective
efforts on the part of franchisees. Such judicial sanction would be
consonant with the public policy underlying the antitrust laws them-
selves, namely the preservation of competition through the conserva-
tion of one of the most essential elements in the competitive formula
—the small, but independent, businessman.
D. Sanctions Under the Massachusetts Act
1. Civil Penalties and Injunctions
Adhering to the pattern of the federal antitrust laws, the new
Massachusetts Act provides heavy penalties in support of its provi-
sions. Section 12 of the Act 2" assigns to the Attorney General the
primary duty of enforcement, incorporating by reference the exten-
sive powers granted to him in the "Baby" FTC Act.'" Those powers
include such matters as the right to obtain both temporary and per-
manent injunctions, 204
 including a civil penalty of not more than ten
thousand dollars for each violation; 208 the power to accept assurance
of discontinuance and voluntary payment of the costs of investigation
or to compel the creation of an escrow fund for restitution to ag-
grieved persons; 290
 and extensive investigatory powers, including the
power to examine records,'" the power to subpoena witnesses,'" and
the power to take testimony under oath. 20° Finally, to aid in obtaining
information, the statute declares any information acquired under its
authority to be inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for "substan-
tially identical transactions," 30° and establishes a fine of not more
than five thousand dollars for failure to appear to give testimony or
for wilfully destroying documentary evidence in order to evade an
investigation."' Punishment for contempt of court is also available
for non-compliance with a court order issued in support of the Attor-
ney General's investigatory powers."' For habitual violations of in-
junctions against practices prohibited under the Act, the Attorney
202 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, I 12 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
293 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 4-8 (Supp. 1970).
294 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 4 (Supp. 1970). By way of contrast, the FTC
is not yet empowered to obtain temporary injunctions, a fact which may account for its
inability to act expeditiously, particularly in the area of false advertising.
295 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, 4 (Supp. 1970).
299 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 5 (Supp. 1970).
297 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 6(1)(b) (Supp. 1970).
298 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 6(1)(c) (Supp. 1970).
290 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 6(1) (a) (Supp. 1970).
son Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 6(7) (Supp. 1970).
an Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 7 (Supp. 1970).
802 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, 7 (Supp. 1970).
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General is empowered to petition the court to dissolve or suspend
a domestic corporation, or to revoke the authority of a foreign corpora-
tion to do business in the Commonwealth.'"
2. Additional Provisions for Damages
In addition to the enforcement rights granted elsewhere in the
Massachusetts Act, Section 12 804 grants to each dealer the right to
obtain damages, to the same extent permitted under the damages
provision of the "Baby" FTC Act."' For any unfair or deceptive
act or practice declared unlawful under the "Baby" FTC Act or any
regulations promulgated thereunder, both damages and equitable re-
lief are available.'" Class suits may also be maintained, 807 and unless
a reasonable tender offer of settlement is made within thirty days of
demand, twice the amount of actual damages may be recovered, and
treble damages may be awarded if the court finds a wilful violation
or finds the manufacturer's refusal to comply with the Act to have
been in bad faith."' Finally, the dealer's reasonable attorney fees and
court costs may be recovered."' These provisions, and particularly
the specific authorization of class suits, go far toward equalizing the
litigational power of the parties.
Subject to the same conditions specified in the federal antitrust
laws,' Section 12 of the Act"' also specifies that final administrative
and court orders in both federal and state governmental proceedings
are to be available as prima facie evidence of a violation."' The avail-
ability of this source of proof of violations will considerably lighten
the burden of a private litigant, leaving to him only the requirement
of showing causation and actual damages.
8°8 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 8 (Supp. 1970).
804 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 12 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
8° 5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9 (Supp. 1970).
306 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (Supp. 1970).
sin Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(2) (Supp. 1970). The conditions specified for
the bringing of a class suit are comparable to those established in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
sos Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (Supp. 1970).
800 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(4) (Supp. 1970).
810 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
811 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 12 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
1312 Under the federal antitrust laws, it is not entirely clear whether a final FTC
cease and desist order is admissible as proof of an antitrust violation. The First Circuit
has held such an order admissible. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421
F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1969). But see Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 308 F. Supp.
1041 (E.D. Pa. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 940 (1970) (holding FTC cease and desist
order inadmissible where it was clear that the order was not predicated upon a finding of
violation of the antitrust laws); cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
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3. Provision Voiding Violative Contracts or Practices
Section 13 of the new Massachusetts Act.'" declares that
[a]ny contract or part thereof or practice thereunder in
violation of any provision of this chapter shall be deemed
against public policy and shall be void and unenforceable.
This provision clearly underscores the strong public policy considera-
tions underlying the Act and, by declaring any violative contract or
practice to be void and unenforceable, the provision effectively imple-
ments the Supreme Court's admonition that in anti-competitive mat-
ters "[w]e must look at the economic reality of the relevant transac-
tions."3" Such a vigorous embodiment of the Act's remedial purposes
should encourage liberal interpretation of all of its provisions and
should fortify it against attack on constitutional grounds. 313
4. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Sanctions
Under Section 14 of the new Massachusetts Act,'" except in case
of concealment, suit must be instituted within four years after the
cause of action accrues.3" Even this limitation is suspended during
the pendency of any federal or state proceeding under the antitrust
laws or trade regulation rules, with the proviso that in such circum-
stances suit must be brought within one year after the final disposi-
tion of such federal or state proceedings." 8
5. Summary and Observations
Each of the foregoing provisions to aid the private litigant is
primarily intended to complement and buttress governmental enforce-
ment efforts. Hopefully, the stiff penalties available under the Act in
the form of double and treble damages and possible invalidation of
313 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, 13 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
s14 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 208
(1968).
Ills See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970), rev'd, 400 U.S. 41
(1970). The reversal, however, was based upon the abstention doctrine and did not
address itself to the merits of the lower court decision invalidating the statute in its
retrospective application on due process grounds. For a similar attack on the recently
enacted Hawaiian Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Act, see General Motors Corp. v.
Burns, 316 F. Supp. 803 (D. Hawaii 1970) (ordering a three-judge court to be con-
vened).
810
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, 14 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
8" This provision is comparable to the statute of limitations governing private suits
under the federal antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C.	 16(b) (1964).
818 See Braun v. Berenson, 432 F.2d 538, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 73,338 (5th Cir. 1970)
(according a liberal interpretation to the federal statute by holding that each subsequent
refusal to lease additional space to the plaintiff, who was alleging a combination between
his lessor and other tenants to prevent him from expanding his facilities, would give rise
to a separate cause of action, thus renewing the statute of limitations).
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the contract will act as strong deterrents against violations.' Further,
all of the enforcement provisions emphasize the strong public policy
underlying the statute, and the consequent need for liberal construc-
tion and application of its terms.
E. Exception for Subsidies in Sales to Governmental Units
For reasons not readily apparent, the new Massachusetts Act
specifically permits manufacturer-subsidized discounts to individual
dealers on vehicles intended for resale to the United States Govern-
ment or to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or any of its political
subdivisions, by exempting such sales from the Act's general prohibi-
tion against price discrimination!'" As to such sales, the Act merely
requires that the manufacturer notify all dealers in the relevant mar-
ket area and make equally available to such dealers the same offer,
discount or other inducement."' In an interesting twist, when the Big
Three recently responded to intense dealer pressure by publicly an-
nouncing the abandonment of their discount structure for state and
local governments, a number of cities, counties and states instituted
treble damage antitrust class suits against the manufacturers alleging
a Big Three combination to maintain resale prices and requesting
injunctive relief in addition to damages..8 2" In the analogous situation
presented in United States v. General Motors Corp., 823 where General
Motors and a number of its regular dealers employed similar tactics
to curtail the activities of the so-called "discount department store"
dealers, the Supreme Court had little difficulty in discerning a classic
combination in restraint of trade. Given the result in that case, it will
be interesting to observe the ultimate response of the courts to the
manufacturers' claim that continuation of governmental discounts
would constitute quantity price discrimination against their dealers
under the Robinson-Patman Act,824 In contrast to the situation in the
General Motors case, in this instance the dealers are left completely
free in their pricing policies on governmental sales.
alp Compare the newly enacted California Franchise Investment Law, which allows
recovery only of actual damages and which allows the defendant to raise as a defense:
(1) the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the facts concerning any alleged misrepresentation
or omission in connection with the sale of a franchise; or (2) that the defendant did not
know, or in the exercise of due care would not have known, of the alleged misrepresenta-
tion or omission. Cal. Corp. Code 31301 (7 Cal. Leg, Serv. 2746 (West 1970)).
320
 Mass. Gen, Laws Ann. ch. 93B, 4(3)(c) (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 714 (West 1970)).
321 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 11 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
322 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 70-2753 (E.D.
Pa., filed Oct. 7, 1970); City of New York v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 70-C-4245
(S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 30, 1970) ; Car Dealer "Insider" Newsletter, Oct. 12, 1970, at 2.
828 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
324 See 15 U.S.C. 1 13(a) (1964).
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F. Severability and Constitutional Problems
The severability clause of the enabling act introducing the new
Massachusetts Ace" may be of crucial importance in view of the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co.,"° holding unconstitutional under the
federal due process clause the retroactive application of a 1964 Puerto
Rico statute327
 prohibiting the termination of a dealership except for
"just cause," a phrase of civil law origin, approximating "good faith."
In holding the Puerto Rico law unconstitutional as applied to a pre-
existing dealership terminable at will, the court did not consider
whether the common law itself may have required "good faith" and
whether the franchising relationship is more of a "status" than a
purely contractual relationship.'" A similar attack by General Motors
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the recently enacted Hawaiian auto
dealer licensing statute is now pending before a three-judge federal
district court in Hawaii."' If these actions are successful, the efforts
of Congress and the states to provide protection for approximately
one million existing franchisees would be tragically frustrated. On the
other hand, the existence of this possibility should impel prompt
legislative action to safeguard all future franchisees, since there is no
question as to the legislative power to control franchise agreements
either entered into, extended or renewed after enactment of the ap-
plicable statute.
IV. COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Narrowly viewed, it was the aim of this article to explore the
economic and legal implications of franchising as a marketing system
in the automobile industry. This has required extensive analysis of
the nature of the franchising relationship, the sources of friction, and
an evaluation of the dealers' complaints in light of existing law,
825 Acts 1970, ch. 814, § 2 (4 Mass. Leg. Serv. 717 (West 1970)).
828 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970), rev'd, 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam reversal
based upon the abstention doctrine with some intimations of criticism of the lower court's
constitutional reasoning).
827 Laws P.R. Ann. tit. 10, § 278a (Supp. 1970). But see the case cited in note 5,
supra.
828 See the discussion of these possibilities supra at pp. 	 and in Brown, Franchis-
ing: A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Texas L. Rev. — (1971).
820 General Motors Corp. v. Burns, 316 F. Supp. 803 (D. Hawaii 1970) (ordering
the convening of a three-judge court to adjudicate the constitutionality of the statute.
The suit attacks Hawaii's Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Act (Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 437-1 to 437-42 (1968)), as recently amended.
The licensing system of regulating the auto industry has been used in several states.
See generally note S supra. This method may be contrasted with the new Massachusetts
Act which took the approach of specifying certain anti-competitive practices which would
be considered violative of the state's preexisting "Baby" FTC Act.
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both common and statutory. While the dealers and individual repre-
sentatives of the manufacturers are undoubtedly cognizant of daily
events in their particular spheres of business activity, it does not
necessarily follow that either are able to assemble the entire picture
in such form as to permit fully informed reflection and broad analysis.
Assessment of the numerous dealer complaints in the area of "operat-
ing," "capital" and "administrative" abuses requires familiarity with
a broad range of factual background seldom available in composite
form.
Such operating matters as inadequate reimbursement for pre-
delivery and warranty work; delays in the daily delivery of autos and
parts; "loading" the dealer with unwanted vehicles; overcharging for
replacement parts; unrealistic sticker pricing, followed by drastic
changes in wholesale pricing policy; factory advertised sales; price-
cutting for the large leasing companies; and many other sources of
daily abuse, may come to be tolerated out of a simple lack of apprecia-
tion for their basic economic injustice and for the fact that each may
be violative of both common law principles of conscionability and the
anti-competitive prohibitions of the antitrust laws.
The same correlation is necessary to appreciate the full meaning
of the dealers' capital complaints, stemming from utter disregard
of the dealer's goodwill and equity in his business. This disregard is
basic to the operation and understanding of such abuses as arbitrary
market restructuring; unreasonable limitations on the transfer, sale
or disposition of the dealership; arbitrary decisions to cancel or
refuse to renew a dealership; direct competition with existing dealer-
ships by factory stores; or the granting of an excessive number of
dealerships in a particular market area.
In the context of such operating and capital abuses, ad-
ministrative shortcomings also become crucial. These cover the
entire range of administrative complaints including abuse of the
dealer's confidential records; abuse of minority dealers; and inade-
quate grievance machinery, embodying procedures and standards
which inevitably preclude fair treatment of the dealers. It has been
suggested that serious consideration be given to the ameliorative role
the dealer associations could fulfill in educating the dealers and the
public; in persuading the manufacturers to improve conditions for the
dealers; in supporting legislative and litigational efforts toward reform;
and ultimately in providing a mechanism for genuine collective nego-
tiations with the manufacturers, as a viable alternative to the destruc-
tive extreme of treble damage class litigation.
Permeating every aspect of the manufacturer-dealer relationship
is the gross imbalance in •bargaining positions between the nation's
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economic giants and the individual dealers. While the dealer is induced
to place his confidence in the manufacturer, there is substantial indica-
tion, from the composite of factory abuses, that this trust has not been
fully honored. In pursuit of justice, the dealer has sought relief at
common law, has petitioned Congress for special legislation and has
suffered fifteen years of frustration under the much touted Dealers'
Day in Court Act. Although new remedial efforts have been mounted,
invoking equitable principles and the federal antitrust laws, it is
obvious that conclusive and effective results may be years away.
In this setting, some questions may arise as to the immediate
efficacy of the newly adopted Massachusetts Act, even though it em-
bodies the first plenary recognition of the requirements of good faith
in franchising and the first far-reaching specification of the anti-
competitive practices intended to be encompassed by its prohibition
against "unfair competition." In the final analysis, this Act is essen-
tially directed at only three companies, each of which is acutely aware
of its proscriptions. Massachusetts is but a single state among fifty,
and the statute can have no legal effect beyond its borders. Since such
matters as the subsidies to leasing and fleet buyers are readily ame-
nable to extrastate continuation, the over-all impact of the new Act, on
a national scale, is comparatively small when contrasted with the vast
scope of the abuses it seeks to regulate. However, its potential national
impact may be found in the guiding principle expressed by Justice
Brandeis, that sunlight is, indeed, the best "disinfectant." The Massa-
chusetts Act may prove to be such a disinfectant if, in perusing its
contents, the dealers obtain a fuller comprehension of their rights;
and if, through reviewing its provisions, each manufacturer representa-
tive, from those charged with the formation of executive policy on
down to the District Manager and his subordinates, becomes more
familiar with the whole range of factory practices and his particular
role in their fulfillment. If this does occur, then perhaps the Act's
national impact will be considerably greater than its limited legal
effect would suggest.
In the final analysis, the most effective weapon in the struggle to
attain equitable treatment for the dealers may be public opinion. But
public opinion, in this sense, is not limited to that of attorneys, judges
and legislators in other jurisdictions, all of whom are immediately con-
cerned with the problem. Most importantly, it is the public opinion of
the influential media, of the academic community and, consequently,
of a more informed public at large, which may turn the tide toward
improving the lot of the dealers. Whatever the source of the ultimate
impetus toward that end, it is clear that radical changes are needed if
franchising is to thrive as the ideal symbiosis of major American in-
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dustry and local entrepreneurs,'" contributing through its dynamic
expansion to the fulfillment of the great "American Dream." 381
880 See Goodwin, The Name of the Franchising Game Is: The Franchise Fee, The
Celebrity or Basic Operations?, 25 Bus. Law. 1403 (1970).
881 As this article goes to press there are indications that much needed changes are
indeed in the wind. In a recent address to the Car and Truck Rental and Leasing Associa-
tion convention, on February 11, 1971, in Miami, Florida, Alan Ward, Director of the
FTC's Bureau of Competition, made a number of comments directly related to some of
the abuses discussed above. While stressing that the views he expressed were his own, the
fact that Mr. Ward is one of the numerous young lawyers who have recently been hired
by the FTC to increase its enforcement activities cannot be disregarded in analyzing the
prospective import of his comments. Particularly pertinent excerpts from his remarks
include the following:
On "goodwill":
We do question . . . the general proposition that the trademark is the entire
source of value within the franchise system and the franchisee's business is
simply an extension of the franchisor's and has no independent value apart from
the value of the physical assets of the business.... Without the hard work and
promotional efforts of the franchisee, not only would the individual franchise
outlet be a failure, but the entire system arguably would produce substantially
less business than the franchisor could produce by his own efforts. It may be,
then, that the franchisee's business should be accorded some "goodwill" value
when the franchise terminates. . . .
On termination:
[U]nder some circumstances, it may well be that arbitrary exercise of the power
to terminate will itself amount to a violation of the law.
On manufacturer control:
Some franchisors require their franchisees to lease land directly from them, to
lease or buy the franchise building, the equipment, the supplies and such services
as insurance from the franchisor or from a single supplier designated by the
franchisor. One franchisor admitted to the staff that the sole reason for requiring
the franchisee to lease the land from him was the control it gave the franchisor
over the franchisee.
On procurement of supplies:
[fin most situations where standardized products exist, the franchisor may
recommend suppliers but he should not go substantially beyond that. And,
under some conditions, recommendations alone may involve antitrust risk.
On the "role" of the regulators:
At a time of rapidly rising costs for each of you, you should pass on to interested
government agencies your ideas on how to increase competition among your
suppliers and servicing organizations. . . . It is in our interest—and yours,
too—that you be aware of what we are doing and that all facts about these
types of practices be brought to our attention. This will insure that any correc-
tive action will be in the public interest.
It would appear that the FTC has listened carefully to the complaints of dealers and, if
Mr. Ward's remarks are any indication of current FTC thinking, many of the abuses
detailed above may be far nearer to correction than had previously been suspected.
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